



Likkutei Sichos

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Present or Future

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1.

RASHI'S TWO IN ONE

In our *parshah*, Hashem instructs Moshe to manufacture anointing oil.¹ After listing various herbs of “pleasant fragrance and taste”² used in producing the anointing oil, the Torah adds, “and one *hin* of olive oil.”³ Rashi quotes the word “**hin**” and comments:

Twelve *lugin*.⁴ And the Sages of Israel differ concerning it: Rabbi Meir says, “They boiled the {herb} roots in the olive oil.” Rabbi Yehudah said to him, “Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even to smear the roots {and thus it certainly was insufficient to boil the herb roots in it⁵! Rather, the roots were steeped in water⁶ so that they would not absorb the oil; the oil was poured on them until the oil absorbed the {herbs’} scent; and then the oil was wiped off the roots.⁷”

We must clarify: When explaining two distinct points concerning the same word, Rashi’s practice is to address each point in its own gloss. As such, why does Rashi combine these two independent concepts — a) the **volume** of the oil, 12 *lugin*, and, b) the procedure for **making** the anointing oil (whether boiling the herbs in oil or pouring the oil on them) — in a **single** gloss? This question is particularly problematic because Rashi: a) writes, “**Venechleku** {**And** the Sages of Israel differ...},” the letter ‘*vav*’ {‘and’} indicating an addition; and, b) emphasizes that their dispute was “concerning **it**,” i.e., concerning the *hin* of oil, rather than writing, “the *herbs were boiled in it*,” which would explain the words, “make it,” mentioned in the following verse.

¹ *Shemos* 30:22.

² Rashi’s commentary on *Shemos* 30:23, s.v. “*V’kinman besem*.” Note that Rashi also mentions *flavor* here and in 30:25 regarding *mirkachas*. See *Likkutei Torah*, end of *parshas Naso*.

³ *Shemos* 30:24.

⁴ {By modern measures, this equates to between 3.6 litres (0.95 gallons) and 7.2 litres (1.9 gallons), depending on the opinion considered.}

⁵ {By modern measure, the volume of the herbs would equal approx. 18kg (approx. 39.68 pounds). Thus, if that volume of spice-roots would be boiled in the small amount of olive oil, the oil would be entirely absorbed into the roots and no liquid would remain.}

⁶ {So that the roots would become saturated with water. Thus, the roots would not absorb the oil that would later be poured on them. Rashi in *Kerisos* 5a, s.v. “*Ushra’an b’mayim*.”}

⁷ *Horayos* 11b; *Kerisos* 5a.

2.

PSHAT, NAMES, AND BAVLI

We should also note several {difficulties arising from} nuances in Rashi's wording:

- a) Before citing the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, Rashi prefaces: "The Sages of Israel differ concerning it." It is reasonable for Rashi to have **prefaced** his remarks by noting that generally, this issue is subject to dispute, for (as mentioned on numerous occasions) by doing so he preemptively establishes that the two quoted explanations **carry equal weight** according to *pshuto shel mikra*.⁸ [Without this preface, Rashi's words would have implied that the **first** opinion is "first" in rank, an approach that is more compatible with Rashi's practice in explaining a verse according to *pshat*.]

However, why does Rashi emphasize, "**The Sages of Israel** (differ concerning it)"? (Does Rashi need to preclude the sages of other nations?) Why does Rashi not say, "Our Rabbis (differ concerning it)," or something similar (as is his practice in many places)?

- b) Why does Rashi also cite the names of **Rabbi Meir** and **Rabbi Yehudah**? (As explained many times, Rashi only cites the name of a quotation's author if by doing so the subject matter is further clarified.)
- c) The following nuance in Rashi's commentary is exceedingly difficult: According to the version of this dispute in the **Babylonian Talmud**,⁹ **Rabbi Yehudah** maintains that *they boiled the roots in the olive oil*, and **Rabbi Yossi** maintains that *they steeped the roots in water, poured the oil on them until the oil absorbed the {herbs}'s scent, and wiped the oil off*

⁸ {In the Hebrew original, "*pshuto shel mikra*," often referred to as "*pshat*." Rashi states in his commentary to *Bereishis* 3:8: "I have come only to explain the plain meaning of the Torah." Although there are many levels and depths of interpretation on the Torah, Rashi adopts a straightforward approach.}

⁹ *Horayos* 11b; *Kerisos* 5a.

the roots. Rashi, however, chose the **Jerusalem Talmud's**¹⁰ version, according to which **Rabbi Meir** is the one who maintains that *they boiled the roots in the olive oil*, and **Rabbi Yehudah** is the one who maintains that *they steeped the roots in water*, etc.

3.

THE ANSWER CAN ONLY BE SAID FOR RABBI YEHUDAH?

We could seemingly answer the first question (raised in section 1)¹¹ simply:

Rashi's remark that the anointing oil contained only 12 *lugin* of oil presents a difficulty: This quantity of oil is small compared with the large volume of herbs mixed into the oil. As such, how would enough oil remain {after mixing the herbs and the oil} for "holy anointing," sufficient to, "anoint with it the Tent of Meeting..."?¹² This difficulty compelled Rashi to supplement his remarks by presenting opinions that clarify how the anointing oil was produced.

However, this solution is unsatisfactory: This difficulty — how enough oil remained — is resolved only according to Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that "they steeped the roots in water so that they would not absorb the oil." According to Rabbi Meir, however, the difficulty remains unresolved, as Rabbi Yehudah retorted, "Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even to smear the roots with it..."!

Thus, Rashi's words are perplexing: Rashi presents Rabbi Meir's opinion that "they boiled the {herb} roots in the olive oil," and immediately follows with Rabbi Yehudah's question, "Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even to smear the roots with it?" without resolving Rabbi Yehudah's question! [Rashi, obviously, does not reject Rabbi Meir's opinion, for had this been the case, Rashi would have not cited Rabbi Meir's opinion at all.]

¹⁰ *Shekalim* 6:1; *Sotah* 8:3.

¹¹ {The question: Why did Rashi combine his remarks on the volume of the oil, and the procedure for making the oil, in the same gloss?}

¹² *Shemos* 30:26. {The verse continues that all the furnishings of the Temple had to be anointed with this oil.}

Even more perplexing: Rashi's **introductory remark**, "And the Sages of Israel differ concerning it," emphasizes, as mentioned, that (not only is Rabbi Meir's opinion not disproven by Rabbi Yehudah's question, but moreover) both opinions are carry **equal** weight in *pshuto shel mikra*!

4.

RASHI CANNOT USE THE TALMUD'S ANSWER

Indeed, the *Babylonian Talmud*¹³ records Rabbi Yehudah's answer to Rabbi Yossi's question:

Did just one miracle occur with respect to the anointing oil? {Many miracles occurred!} Initially, it only measured twelve *lugin*, and yet the *Mishkan*, its furnishings, Aharon, and his sons were anointed with it... and it all remained in existence {undiminished in quantity} for {use in} the Future Era....

Meaning, a miracle occurred while manufacturing the anointing oil — the roots did not absorb the oil.

Understanding Rashi's remarks this way is not possible, however, since Rashi does not mention (or even allude) here that Rabbi Meir maintains that a miracle occurred.

Furthermore, Rashi later remarks on the verse¹⁴ ("oil... for your generations"): "Our Sages deduce **from here** that all of it remains in existence for the Future Era." This implies that until the verse, "for your generations," it was unnecessary for Rashi to introduce the novelty that a miracle occurred with respect to the oil.

We are thus compelled to say that according to Rashi, Rabbi Yehudah's question, "Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even to smear the roots with it?" from the outset, does not pose a difficulty to Rabbi Meir's opinion. This

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ *Shemos* 30:31.

is difficult to comprehend: a) Ostensibly, this is a serious question in *pshat*. On the contrary, according to the Talmud's teaching, "And was just one miracle performed with the anointing oil?, etc.," this difficulty is resolved. But there is no hint of this according to *pshat*. b) On the other hand, if Rashi maintains that the difficulty's resolution is so obvious that it needn't be stated explicitly, why in his remarks would Rashi quote the talmudic passage that raises this difficulty?

5.

ANOINTING OIL OR ANOINTING ROOTS

The explanation is as follows:

According to Rabbi Meir's position that the roots were **boiled** in the oil (and according to Rashi's position in *p'shat*), the question, "Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even to smear the roots with it?" poses no difficulty. The absorption of oil by the roots through boiling is not problematic because Rabbi Meir maintains that anointing oil did not have to be done with oil **exclusively**. Rather, anointing could be performed with a mixture of oil and roots (that were liquified by being boiled in the oil), despite the anointing substance being called "the anointing **oil**," regarding which the Torah says, "pour it"¹⁵ and, "sprinkle it"¹⁶ {implying clearly that it was a liquid}. However, since the cooking of the roots was described as "*sholkan*" {boiled}, connoting cooked more thoroughly than normally, cooked until it was very well-done, clearly this mixture did not resemble roots at all, but rather, as **Rashi** puts it, "they melted"¹⁷ into a liquid.

Rabbi Yehudah, on the other hand, disagrees. He maintains that as its name implies, the anointing oil had to be actual oil. It could not (primarily) consist of liquefied roots that became an oily liquid by being boiled in oil. Therefore, he maintains, "they steeped the roots in water... and wiped the oil **off the roots**."

¹⁵ *Shemos* 29:7.

¹⁶ *Shemos* 29:21.

¹⁷ *Pesachim* 39a s.v. "*Shlukin*."

This explains why Rashi also quotes the nuanced wording describing the difficulty that Rabbi Yehudah raises regarding Rabbi Meir's position: "Surely the quantity of oil was not sufficient even **to smear** the roots with it." (Although according to Rabbi Meir the roots **absorbed** the oil — oil was not **smear**ed on the roots — the result being that the oil was not recognizable (as an independent entity) at all. As such, Rabbi Yehudah should have raised a more fundamental difficulty: "How can this be called oil?" as discussed earlier.)

The word "smear" emphasizes that the substance being smeared was secondary and **totally** insignificant compared to what it was being smeared on (the roots). Obviously, this mixture cannot be named after the negligible ingredient (the oil).

6.

THE PRESENT OR THE FUTURE

The reasoning behind this dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah:

The Torah says,¹⁸ "Make it into sacred anointing oil, a blended compound, the handiwork of a perfumer; it shall be oil of sacred anointment." Meaning, this command consists of two parts, fulfilled in two stages: a) When the oil is processed — "**Make it** (the olive oil) into... a blended compound, the handiwork of a perfumer." This stage entails to **processing** the oil into "a blended compound," as Rashi explains, "Any substance mixed with another substance until one becomes infused with either the scent or flavor of the other is called, '*mirkachas*' {'a blended compound'}." b) After this processing is complete, "**it shall be oil** of sacred anointment" (for eternity).

The difference between the positions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah relates to this issue — which of these two stages has primacy.

According to Rabbi Meir ("they boiled the roots in it"), processing **the oil** into "a blended compound" fulfilled this command perfectly. Since the ideal method of combining two substances ("any substance **mixed with** another

¹⁸ *Shemos* 30:25.

substance”) is to cook them together. Thus, Rabbi Meir maintains that in order to fulfil the command to “**make it into... a blended compound**” in the most perfect way, they had to “**boil the roots in the olive oil.**”

Nonetheless, as a result of this process, the command that “it shall be oil of sacred anointment” would not have been fulfilled perfectly in that it did not produce (unadulterated) oil; rather, it was mixed with roots.

In contrast, according to Rabbi Yehudah, even though “they steeped the roots in water... poured the oil on them until... and wiped...,” processing the oil only involved pouring and wiping. Thus, the command to make “a blended compound” (“any substance mixed with another substance”) was fulfilled imperfectly because the scent of the {herb} roots was not infused into the oil by **cooking** the oil **together** with the roots. Nevertheless, the *result* of this process was perfect: The command that “**it shall be oil** of sacred anointment,” was fulfilled in its fullest sense, for it was proper oil (and completely **unadulterated**).

Since *pshuto shel mikra* offers no compelling evidence which of the two stages has primacy — the command to, “**Make it into... a blended compound,**” or the the command that “**it shall be oil** of sacred anointment” — Rashi prefaces (before presenting the actual dispute) with, “The Sages of Israel **differ concerning it...**” He does so in order to emphasize that these two opinions carry equal weight in *pshuto shel mikra*.

7.

AN ALL ENCOMPASSING DISPUTE

On this basis, we can also clarify Rashi’s nuanced wording, “**the Sages of Israel** differ concerning it.” The two opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah as to how to prepare the oil reflect two different viewpoints toward fulfilling Torah and *mitzvos*, such as, in our case, concerning the production of the oil. Thus, this dispute is between “the Sages of Israel”:

Is it preferable to attain perfection in the present, even though this will lead to future imperfection, or is it more important to strive for (everlasting) perfection in the future, even if this can only be achieved by acting in the present in ways that are flawed?

Similarly, in our context: Hashem did not elucidate the details of this commandment with respect to the process of making the oil. Rather, He only commanded generally to “make it into... a blended compound” (and by doing so), “it shall be the oil of sacred anointment.” Hence, the practical application of this commandment hinges on the dispute of the Sages of Israel regarding the performance of all *mitzvos*.

Rabbi Meir maintains that when the Jewish people had to **make** the oil, they primarily took into account perfection in the **present**, while **making** the oil, to fulfill the commandment to “make **it**,” “a blended compound...” Thus, “**They boiled the roots** in the olive oil...” despite the **subsequent** consequence — the command to make “a blended compound” would be fulfilled imperfectly since the oil would not be discernible as a separate entity.

In contrast, Rabbi Yehudah asserts that the present merely serves to prepare for perfection in the future. Therefore, we cannot suggest that “they boiled the roots in the olive oil,” for this would lead to **imperfection** in fulfilling the command that “**it shall be the oil** of sacred anointment.”

Accordingly, Rabbi Yehudah maintains that “they steeped the roots in water, etc.,” even though by preparing the oil in this way, the command to “make it,” “a blended compound” (in the present) would be imperfect. Nonetheless, the oil would be perfect afterwards (in the future).

8.

A DISPUTE ABOUT A CUSTODIAN

On this basis, we can also appreciate why Rashi cites the Sages of Israel by name, and why Rashi chooses the version in which **Rabbi Meir** maintains that they boiled the roots in it, and **Rabbi Yehudah** responded that they seeped the roots in water (rather than the version in which **Rabbi Yehudah** and **Rabbi Yossi** as the disputants). Rashi had **previously** quoted a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, and there, too, their dispute hinges on the same reasoning (and there, too, Rashi prefaces, “**The Sages of Israel** differ concerning it”).

Regarding the law of a renter,¹⁹ Rashi writes in *parshas Mishpatim*:²⁰

The Torah does not specify his status, whether he is judged like an unpaid custodian (who is liable only for negligence) or like a paid custodian (who is liable also to pay for theft or loss). Therefore, the Sages of Israel differ concerning him: How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: “As an unpaid custodian.” Rabbi Yehudah says: “As a paid custodian.”

At first glance, the reasoning behind their positions is as follows: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a renter is like a paid custodian, since a renter may use an ox that he rents; such usage is considered compensation for his guardianship. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that since a renter **pays** for the benefit he

¹⁹ {*Parshas Mishpatim* (*Shemos* 22:6-14) specifies four cases where one person has another’s object and their obligations in situations of loss.

The unpaid custodian is one who takes care of an article without receiving payment for his services. The unpaid custodian is liable only for damages that result from his own negligence. The unpaid custodian does not have permission to use the item.

The paid custodian is one who watches an item in exchange for monetary compensation. In addition to the obligations of the unpaid custodian, the paid custodian is also liable should the article be stolen, lost or misplaced. The paid custodian also may not use the deposited article.

The renter: The subject of our discussion in this *sicha*.

The borrower: The borrower is liable for the entrusted item under all circumstances, including those that are not the borrower’s fault. The borrower’s only exemption is for damage resulting from the normal use of the item, for example, if a borrowed ox dies as a result of normal plowing. [*Bava Metzia* 33 and on. See also Rashi in *parshas Mishpatim*.]}

²⁰ *Shemos* 22:14; *Bava Metzia* 80b.

receives, he in essence receives no compensation. As such, *halachah* treats him the same as an unpaid custodian.

Rabbi Yehudah's rationale for his comparison of a renter to a paid custodian is baffling: A paid custodian is liable for the theft or the loss of the object he was guarding because he was paid to **guard it**. Meaning, the owner pays the custodian so that he will guard the object more carefully, protecting it from being stolen or getting lost. As such, since an owner gives permission for a renter to use the item (**not** to compensate him for safeguarding it, but rather) in exchange for the rent paid, why should the renter be obligated to safeguard the object (more scrupulously) as a paid custodian, when the renter receives no payment for his **guardianship**?

9.

PAY ME NOW AND PROTECT MY OBJECT IN THE FUTURE

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah's dispute here hinges on their general disagreement: Is the present more significant or the future?

If we presume that an owner {who rents out his ox} is primarily concerned with the present, that is, his desire to make money (by renting out his ox), but he **also** wants his ox to be guarded, he would probably agree for the renter to guard his ox (not with the more attentive guardianship of a paid custodian, the purpose of which would be to prevent an unusual occurrence in the **future**, but rather) with the standard guardianship of unpaid custodian. Doing so protects his property in the usual manner in the *present*. The concern that **in the future** the object may get lost or stolen does not deter the owner from (renting out the object and) making money **right now**.

Thus, according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that concern for the present always supersedes concern for the future, we must conclude that an owner's expectation would be for the renter to provide the **standard** guardianship of an unpaid custodian.

In contrast, Rabbi Yehudah maintains that concern for the future always supersedes concern for the present. Therefore, as long as an owner is not assured that his property will enjoy a greater level of protection, which will also preserve it for the future, he would **never** accept a lower level of guardianship, even in exchange for money received in the present.

Since a renter makes use of the article, he is unlike an unpaid custodian who merely does the owner a favor. Thus, we must maintain that the owner expects a greater level of protection for his property from the renter.

10.

KEZAYIS OF THE MOMENT AND *KEBEITZAH* OF THE FUTURE

To support the opinion that this dispute is one of several examples of a broader dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, let's consider a similar dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah:²¹ “How much must a person eat for {him to be obligated to participate in} a *zimmun*?²² (Rabbi Meir says:) A *kezayis*.²³ Rabbi Yehudah says: A *kebeitzah*.”²⁴

The *Talmud* explains this dispute:²⁵

They disagree regarding the interpretation of verses.²⁶ Rabbi Meir maintains: “You shall eat” refers to eating; “and be satisfied” refers to drinking; and *eating* is defined as the consumption of a *kezayis*. Rabbi

²¹ *Berachos* 45a.

²² {*Zimmun* lit. invitation refers to the obligation when a group of people eat together for one person to invite the others to recite “Grace after Meals.” Originally, the way the *zimmun* was performed was by one person reciting the entire Grace and the others listening. Nowadays, one person invites everyone to recite Grace together. See further details, *Berachos*, *ibid.*}

²³ {A measurement the size of an olive, although this is a measure of volume, in modern measures by size it would equal between 22.5cm³ (8.85 inches³) and 33.3cm³ (13.1 inches³) depending on the differing views of the *halachic* authorities.}

²⁴ {A measurement the size of an egg, although this is a measure of volume, in contemporary measures by size it would equal between 55cm³ (21.6 inches³) and 100cm³ (39.3 inches³) depending on the differing views of the *halachic* authorities.}

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 49b.

²⁶ {The source of the obligation to recite “Grace after Meals” is from *Devarim* 8:10 “And you shall eat and be satisfied, you must therefore bless Hashem your L-rd for the good land that He has given you.”}

Yehudah maintains: “You shall eat and be satisfied” refers to eating to the point of satiation. And what is that point? The consumption of a *kebeitzah*.

However, remarking on this passage, *Tosafos* says that²⁷ “these verses merely serve as an *asmachta*,²⁸ because biblically, total satiation is required.” Therefore, we must conclude that each of the disputants expounds the verse according to his consistently held viewpoint, as their respective expositions relate to the rabbinic obligation.

According to Rabbi Meir who maintains that our primary concern is the *present*, we must assume that the (rabbinic) obligation for *zimmun* in the *present* is contingent on {even minimal} eating. Since consuming a *kezayis* is defined as eating, we can expound (using an *asmachta*) that “you shall eat” is an independent clause {unconnected to “and be satisfied”²⁹}; thus, as soon as a person eats, and “eating is defined as the consumption of a *kezayis*,” he is obligated to do a *zimmun*.

In contrast, according to Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that our primary concern is the *future*, what is **eaten** in the present is not decisive. Rather, the **results** and consequences of eating — satiation — is decisive; it is **this** {consideration} that triggers the obligation **to bless** Hashem. Thus, what obligates *zimmun* is “eating to the point of satiation. And what is that point? The consumption of a *kebeitzah*.”

11.

TZRICHAH

We have discussed many times that when we find several disputes between *Tana'im*³⁰ (or generally all great Jewish scholars) regarding different issues that all hinge on the same, consistent viewpoint of each disputant, we must explain

²⁷ *Tosfos* on *Berachos* 49b, s.v. “*Rabbi Meir savar*.”

²⁸ {Lit. “support” or “reliance.” This term refers to an allusion found in the Torah for a rabbinic prohibition or any other *halachah*. It does not base the law on the cited verse, but uses the verse as a hint that lends support.}

²⁹ {For if these two clauses were connected, a person would only be obligated in *zimmun* if he ate enough food to be satiated.}

³⁰ {*Tana'im* lit. teachers. This title refers to the Sages of the *Mishnaic* era.}

that each example of the dispute was necessary³¹ because it conveys a novelty. Meaning, due to the unique circumstances in **each example**, there are grounds for one to think that the disputants' consistent viewpoints do not apply **here**. Therefore, their dispute must be restated in each case individually.

Therefore, in our scenarios:

a) Since the instruction to produce the anointing oil was a commandment from **Hashem**, and from His perspective, past, present and future are **as one**,³² the future is already here in the **present**.

This point is explicit in the *Tosefta's* emphasis that³³ “the days and hours are like a hair's breadth before Hashem.” As the *Rogatchover Gaon*³⁴ explains: For Hashem, time is “as a single point,” “a portion that is indivisible.”³⁵

Even though fulfilling this command depended on the actions of the **Jewish people**, since they acted to fulfill **Hashem's** command, it would have been reasonable for them to have fulfilled His command in a manner consistent with His perspective, so to speak, where past, present and future are **as one**.

b) In the case of a renter, there is no certainty that in the future the object will be stolen or lost, especially as it is being guarded (at the very least, according to the standards of an unpaid custodian). We are dealing with a remote **concern** (unlike the cases of the anointing oil and the conditions for *zimmun*, in which the “future” is certain). Thus, one may have thought that in this case, we should **only** consider the present.

³¹ {“*VeTzricha*,” in the Aramaic original; lit., “and this is necessary.” This talmudic term introduces an explanation of the necessity of the *Talmud* giving more than one illustration of a single legal principle.}

³² *Shaar HaYichud veHaemunah*, ch. 7, p. 82a, based on *Zohar*, vol. 3 (in “*Raaya Mehemna*”), p. 257b (end).

³³ *Eduyos* 1:11.

³⁴ {Rabbi Yosef Rosen, known as the *Rogatchover Gaon* and *Tzofnas Paneach*, (1858-1936) was one of the most prominent talmudic scholars of the early 20th-century. He was famous for his photographic memory and tendency to connect seemingly unrelated laws and issues in Torah. In his youth, the Rebbe had much correspondence with the *Rogatchover Gaon*, and the Rebbe refers to his views in many discussions throughout *Likkutei Sichos*.}

³⁵ *Mahadura Tinyanah*, p. 20; *Terumos*, p. 116; see *Mefaneach Tzfunos*, ch. 3, par. 15.

Furthermore, regarding the renter, the future theft and the present rental fee are two disparate, unrelated, elements. As such, we cannot infer from the case of the renter regarding the cases of the anointing oil and the *zimmun*, in which the future outcome is the **aim** and **consequence** of the present activity. As such, we could posit that in these two latter cases, all authorities would agree that at the present, one must also consider the future.

c) Had their positions been outlined explicitly {only} in the context of teaching the qualification for *zimmun*, we would not have been able to have extrapolated to the other cases, because the issue here is what **constitutes** eating (in this verse). As such, we could have posited that this case was unrelated to the above-mentioned dispute as to what is more decisive: the *present* or the *future*.

Therefore, the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah had to be stated explicitly in all three cases.

-From talks delivered on Shabbos *parshas Ki Sisa*, 5735 (1975)