Citation Verification Report
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MARK L. BUNCE, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-cv-01740-KNS
Plaintiff,
v.
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS, INC., and MATHU RAJAN,
Defendants.
Judge Kai N. Scott
This Court's February 2, 2026 Order (ECF No. 205) directed that Raja Rajan pay the reasonable travel costs of Plaintiff Mark L. Bunce for the cancelled July 1, 2024 deposition. The Order was precise: Mr. Rajan was not required to pay for "luxury travel accommodations (e.g., first-class plane ticket, luxury hotel)," but only "up to a reasonable amount that reflects the cost of standard economy flights and non-luxury hotels."
Plaintiff has now submitted a travel expense claim totaling $\$ 7,807.38$-an amount that bears no relationship to those reasonable limits. He denied a request to meet and confer, in which he could have adjusted the expenses request voluntarily without the need to burden the Court.
Attorney Kohler overreaches and also seeks compensation for airline points, which he claims cost another $\$ 2-3$ thousand in US dollars. The claim encompasses premium-class Virgin Atlantic airfare for two people, nine nights at The Logan Hotel (a Curio Collection luxury property in Center City Philadelphia), upscale dining at Philadelphia's most expensive
restaurants, alcohol purchases, private car service, and expenses plainly attributable to Plaintiff's spouse, who attended as a personal companion with no litigation function.
Those calculations and submissions are in direct contravention of the Court order in an express and blatant manner. This Memorandum addresses three issues: (1) the appropriate calculation of Plaintiff's reasonable travel expenses; (2) sanctions for necessitating this motion by refusing to meet and confer and other conduct; and (3) the appropriateness of posting a bond instead of paying Attorney Kohler for the sanctions against Raja Rajan.
Courts have consistently held that parties must mitigate their expenses when circumstances change. See InL. p2-1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) 26(g) (requiring certifications that discovery expenses are reasonable-Attorney Kohler certified that Bunces expenses are reasonable); InL. p2-2 Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1981)) (party must act reasonably to minimize costs).
A court awarding expenses as sanctions retains full authority and obligation to ensure those expenses are reasonable. See InL. p2-3 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). The Court's inherent power to impose sanctions does not create a blank check; the amount must be tethered to the actual harm caused. See In re InL. p2-4 In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002)) (sanctions limited to costs resulting from the particular misconduct).
Under 28 U.S.C. § InL. p2-5 28 U.S.C. § 1927, any attorney who vexatiously multiplies proceedings may be required to satisfy excess costs, expenses, and fees personally. See InL. p2-6 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991(about the Court's inherent powers)). A finding of bad faith, vexatious
conduct, or conduct for oppressive reasons suffices. InL. p3-1 Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018)).
The Court's Order distinguished between luxury and reasonable travel with clarity. The claimed expenses violate that boundary in every category. Plaintiff does not provide or describe the exchange rate used and when for purposes of rates (British pounds to US dollars). All numbers converted may not be reliable and are certainly not transparent.
It should be noted that Plaintiff has only provided screenshots post hoc to the alleged purchase; it may not be reliable. Plaintiff traveled in Virgin Atlantic Premium class. The documentation reveals an implicit claim that had he paid cash rather than loyalty points, the fare would have been approximately $\$ 2,712$ per person. Federal courts consistently hold that business or premium-class airfare is unreasonable for routine litigation travel absent extraordinary circumstances-none of which exist here. Economy round-trip airfare from London to Philadelphia in June 2024 was available for approximately $\$ 650-\$ 850$ per person. Mr. Rajan's obligation should be limited to approximately $\$ 750$ for one person.
The Virgin Atlantic confirmation lists two adult passengers: Mark L. Bunce and Andrea Bunce. Hotel folios from The Logan Hotel reflect double occupancy for nine nights, with dining receipts showing a guest count of two throughout the stay. Federal courts uniformly hold that a spouse's travel is a personal expense, not recoverable as litigation costs. See Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension \& Ret. Fund, No. 93-CV-1719, 1996 WL 732133, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996); Mrs. Bunce played no role in the deposition, provided no testimony, and served no litigation purpose. She was deposed already. Her expenses should be excluded entirely, reducing the claim by approximately $50 \%$.
Plaintiff chose The Logan Hotel, a luxury property in one of Philadelphia's most expensive neighborhoods, at approximately $\$ 280$ per night, for nine nights (June 26 - July 5, 2024). The deposition was scheduled for July 1. Even assuming arrival the day before and departure the day after, a three-night stay would have been entirely adequate. Comparable business-class hotels near the deposition site-including Hampton Inn, Courtyard by Marriott, and Hilton Garden Inn-were available for $\$ 110-\$ 140$ per night. Three nights at $\$ 125 /$ night represents the reasonable hotel expense: $\$ 375$, plus applicable taxes of approximately $\$ 56$.
On June 26, 2024, Mr. Rajan notified Plaintiff's counsel by email that the deposition was cancelled. Despite this advance notice, Plaintiff's documentation reveals that hotel stays, restaurant visits, and ground transportation continued through July 5, 2024-a full eight days after the cancellation notice. Parties are obligated to mitigate expenses when circumstances change. See InL. p2-2 Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1981)). All expenses incurred after June 28 -at the latest-should be excluded as voluntarily chosen personal travel. This alone accounts for approximately $\$ 3,260$ of the claimed total.
Plaintiff claims $\$ 1,536.36$ in food and drink expenses at some of Philadelphia's most expensive restaurants, with receipts reflecting per-meal expenditures of $\$ 100-\$ 226$ and guest counts of two. Multiple receipts include itemized alcohol charges. The federal per diem rate for
meals and incidental expenses in Philadelphia in 2024 was $\$ 79$ per day. For a three-day trip, reasonable meals would total approximately $\$ 195$. Federal courts routinely exclude alcohol from recoverable costs. See In re InL. p5-1 In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2008)).
Similarly, Plaintiff hired luxury private car service (Onward Travel Solutions Ltd.) rather than standard taxis or ride-sharing, at a cost of $£ 76$ each way for airport transfersapproximately double the cost of standard alternatives. Reasonable ground transportation should not exceed $\$ 150$ total.
Plaintiff's suggestion that the "true cost" of airfare was $\$ 10,519.50$ because loyalty points were used has no legal merit. The use of personal loyalty points is a private benefit that reduces out-of-pocket expenditure; it does not create a windfall recovery right. Recovery should be limited to actual out-of-pocket expenses-and even those are subject to the economy-class limitation.
Based on the foregoing, reasonable recoverable expenses for this cancelled deposition are as follows:
Economy airfare (1 person, roundtrip LHR-PHL): $\$ 750$
Hotel (3 nights $\times \$ 125$, standard business hotel): $\$ 375$
Hotel taxes (estimated 15\%): $\$ 56$
Ground transportation (airport + local transfers): $\$ 130$
Reasonable meals (3 days $\times \$ 65 /$ day): $\$ 195$
TOTAL REASONABLE EXPENSES: $\$ 1,506$
This figure reflects the cost-conscious travel that the Court's Order contemplated. In the event the Court is inclined to reduce-but not eliminate-any category, Mr. Rajan respectfully
requests that the Court use the per-category averages implied by the reasonable ranges above as its basis for any modified award.
Attorney Michael P. Kohler of Miller \& Martin PLLC has engaged in a documented pattern of conduct that merits the Court's attention. Most notably, when Mr. Rajan sought to schedule a good-faith meet-and-confer as required by InL. p6-1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). P. 26(c)(1) and InL. p6-2 Local Rule 26.1(f) 26.1(f), Attorney Kohler refused, representing that there was "nothing to discuss," forcing Mr. Rajan to seek judicial intervention rather than resolve the matter cooperatively. This exchange is documented in the email chain attached as Exhibit A.
This Court has already found that Mr. Rajan's failure to meet and confer on another matter was done in bad faith and sanctioned him accordingly. The email record, however, reveals a more complete picture: Mr. Rajan sought the conference, and Attorney Kohler refused it. Attorney Kohler's refusal-and his subsequent misrepresentation or omission of that refusal in filings before this Court-implicates the same standards under which Mr. Rajan was sanctioned. Beyond the meet-and-confer, Defendants' review of the filings in this case has identified additional instances in which Attorney Kohler's representations to this Court warrant scrutiny under InL. p6-3 Rule 11 11 and § 1927. See email string Exhibit A.
Most notably he represented to the court that his client Mr. Bunce boarded a plan from overseas and was in Philadelphia when the deposition was cancelled. That is blatantly false as demonstrated below.
An email on June 26 many days before Mr. Bunce boarded a plane, Mr. Kohler was informed that Mr. Bunce deposition was "unnecessary." Since it was never formally scheduled with a notice of deposition and the like the "unnecessary" characterization is accurate.
This relief is not sought not as retribution, but in the interest of a complete and accurate record. Mr. Rajan's professional reputation has been substantially damaged by this litigation. He deserves a fair opportunity to establish that the conduct of opposing counsel was at least equally problematic-and that his own failings, while real, occurred in an adversarial environment in which the opposing side was not operating in good faith. He should be paid for the work on this filing since he tried to contact Attorney Kohler to avoid wasting the Court's time.
What is worse is that the sanction is for cancellation of a deposition BEFORE, not after (6 days before travel). The deposition was not formally scheduled and was not even noticed. His wife's deposition, on the other hand, was formally scheduled and noticed. Sanctions for travel expenses 6 days before a flight must only be interpreted as a party can use cancellations of unscheduled depositions as weapons and part of litigation recoveries.
A monetary sanctions award is a money judgment for purposes of InL. p7-2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) 62 and may be stayed upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.
InL. p7-1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 62(b) provides that "[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security." A monetary sanctions award-whether imposed under InL. p7-5 Rule 62 11, 28 U.S.C. § InL. p2-5 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the Court's inherent authorityconstitutes a money judgment within the meaning of Rule 62.
The purpose of a supersedeas bond is not punitive; it is protective. It preserves the status quo while fully securing the prevailing party's ability to collect if the judgment is affirmed. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized the longstanding federal practice that a supersedeas bond operates to stay execution of a money judgment pending appeal. See InL. p8-1 Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n., 636 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Though that case is in the DC circuit, it persuasive authority that is important.
Under InL. p7-5 Rule 62 62, once a proper bond is posted, enforcement is stayed. The prevailing party is protected by the bond, and execution may proceed only if the appeal is unsuccessful or if the time to appeal expires without an appeal being filed. Since Raja Rajan is former counsel his right to appeal may have been delayed due to InL. p8-2 Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999)).
The Third Circuit has explained that the purpose of a supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo and secure the appellee during the pendency of the appeal. In In re InL. p8-3 In re Diet Drugs, supra.., the Court of Appeals confirmed that Rule 62 provides the mechanism for staying enforcement of monetary judgments while protecting the judgment creditor through adequate security.
District courts within the Third Circuit routinely apply Rule 62 to monetary awardsincluding attorneys' fees and sanctions-because such awards are fixed monetary obligations enforceable as judgments. Once reduced to a sum certain, a sanctions award is treated no differently from any other money judgment for purposes of post-judgment stay practice.
Federal appellate courts have consistently treated sanctions awards as money judgments subject to supersedeas bond practice. See, e.g., InL. p8-4 Hebert v. Exxon Corp. 953 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1992)) (money judgments). Sanctions must be money judgments to enforce.
While some authorities arise outside the Third Circuit, they reflect the uniform federal InL. p9-1 Rule 62(b): a monetary sanctions award is secured-not defeated-by a supersedeas bond. The bond fully protects the opposing party during appellate review and becomes executable only if the judgment survives appeal or appellate rights are not exercised.
Because the sanctions award at issue is a fixed monetary obligation, InL. p7-5 Rule 62 62(b) authorizes a stay upon the posting of an adequate bond. The opposing party's interests are fully protected by that security. Immediate execution is unnecessary and would undermine the orderly appellate process. The Federal Rules and binding Third Circuit authority confirm that posting a bond is the proper procedural mechanism to secure a sanctions judgment pending appeal. The final judgment of the underlying case is a long way off Fn. 1, so the bond protects Mr. Bunce while the underlying case is being tried.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order: (1) the appropriate calculation of Plaintiff's reasonable travel expenses; (2) sanctions for necessitating this motion by refusing to meet and confer and other conduct; and (3) the appropriateness of posting a bond instead of paying Attorney Kohler cash for the sanctions against Raja Rajan.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: February 20, 2026
/s/ Raja Rajan RAJA RAJAN, ESQUIRE of RAJAN LAW GROUP
From: Michael Kohler Michael.Kohler@millermartin.com
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2026 9:01 AM
To: Raja Rajan raja@advisory-capital-solutions.com
Cc: raja@rajanlawgroup.com raja@rajanlawgroup.com; Laura Burnett Laura.Burnett@millermartin.com; Tammy Prater Tammy.Prater@millermartin.com
Subject: RE: InL. p10-1 Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations; CAN: 2:23-cv-01740
There's nothing to discuss. The court ordered you pay Mr. Bunce \$78,705.23. That should be paid immediately. If you don't believe Mr. Bunce's travel expenses of $\$ 10,519.50$ were reasonable or necessary, then you can address that with the court, but that should not hold up the immediate payment up $\$ 78,705.23$. If payment is not received by Friday, then we will seek appropriate relief from the court and seek reimbursement of our attorneys' fees for having to do so. Thank you.
Michael P. Kohler
in $\square$
f (404) 962-6303
Suite 2100 | 1180 W Peachtree Street, NW | Atlanta, GA 30309
From: Raja Rajan raja@advisory-capital-solutions.com
Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2026 10:09 AM
To: Michael Kohler Michael.Kohler@millermartin.com
Cc: raja@rajanlawgroup.com; Laura Burnett Laura.Burnett@millermartin.com; Tammy
Prater Tammy.Prater@millermartin.com; Raja Rajan raja@advisory-capitalsolutions.com
Subject: Re: Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations; CAN: 2:23-cv-01740
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
Let's have a meet and confer conference before Thursday at 5. The expenses in my opinion are neither reasonable nor appropriate.
I'll work around your schedule -wed afternoon easier. Thursday all day.
Let me know.
Raja Rajan
Sorry for any Typos-wrote it on my phone.
On Feb 16, 2026, at 2:53 PM, Michael Kohler Michael.Kohler@millermartin.com wrote:
Mr. Rajan,
The Court sanctioned you in the amount of $\$ 78,705.23$, plus Mr. Bunce's reasonable travel expenses, which total $\$ 10,519.50$. Full payment of $\$ 89,224.73$ needs to be delivered immediately. Attached are my firm's wire instructions.
Please confirm status of payment.
Thank you.
Michael P. Kohler
in
$\square$
$\square$
d (404) 962-6403
f (404) 962-6303
Suite 2100 | 1180 W Peachtree Street, NW | Atlanta, GA 30309
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged and confidential, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, please be aware that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify us by reply e-mail and delete this message and any attachments. Thank you.
I hereby certify that on February 20, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via the Court's ECF system upon all counsel of record, and via electronic mail upon Michael P. Kohler, Esquire (Michael.Kohler@millermartin.com) and Michael D. Homans, Esquire (mhomans@homanspeck.com) the next day.
/s/ Raja Rajan
Raja Rajan, Esquire