

Ledo WALAWBUM inkangawtaung nhpum-ga shadazup MYITKYINA



The Burman News



Official publication of Merrill's Marauders Association, Inc.

February, 1985

Come All Ye Faithful — to the Marauders Reunion in Cleveland, Ohio

"Welcome to Cleveland!" That's what I want to say to each and everyone of you in person when you once again come to this fine city to participate in the 39th Annual Reunion of Merrill's Marauders. The Reunion is now in the planning stage, and I can personally assure you that a great time will be had by all. Reservations for the event have been made at the Cleveland Hilton South which is just ten minutes from the heart of Cleveland. There will be plenty of food, fun, hospitality, and camaraderie, with everything first class and top quality.

Families are welcome too, of course. Cleveland offers many fine attractions to be seen and visited, with something to interest everyone. But the most important item on the agenda will be meeting with your friends again to share news, memories, and plans for the future.

Complete details for the Reunion will be published later in the year, but now is the time to mark your calendar. Remember, I'll be looking for you so I can shake your hand and say: "WELCOME TO CLEVELAND!"

SAM RAPISARDA,
Chairman

Book Sale

Would you like to buy a copy of one of these books for a gift to one of your children, grandchildren or a friend? Or yourself?

"The Marauders" by Charlton Ogburn (Platoon Ldr, 1st Bn) paperback edition for \$7.00.

"Shots Fired in Anger" by Capt. John George (Int Off, 3rd Bn), a hardcover book published by NRA. Covers action in SW Pacific as well as Burma. Cost. \$16.00.

Send check to Merrill's Marauders at 11244 No. 33rd St., Phoenix, AZ 85028.

Fortunate

We have been fortunate in recent years in obtaining from members, copies of Special Orders and other valuable historical data. We will publish as space is available. Thanks especially to Ken Gumaer and John Keslik for their contributions this year. Note from following SO names of men who were with us. Help us track down those who are not in our directory.



Men and animals cross the Tanai Kai River via a bridge built by Kachin tribesmen near the village of Ning Awng, Northern Burma, 18 March 1944. [Signal Corps Photo]

FATHER JAMES STUART'S CHRONICLE OF THE MARAUDERS THROUGH THE TAKING OF THE AIRFIELD AT MYITKYINA

Editor's Note: This is a continuation of the notes made by Father Stuart that began in the previous issue of The Burman News. It is published on a space-available basis and will be continued in the next issue.

Father James Stuart, born in Ireland, was a Columban missionary among the Kachins. He died August 11, 1955, in his family home in Moneymore, Co. Derry, Ireland, at the age of 46. He is buried at Navan, headquarters of the Columban Fathers in Ireland

The fall of Walawbum completed the first phase of Galahad's operations. The Americans had killed 800 of the enemy, forced a major Japanese withdrawal, and had paved the way for the resumption of Chinese progress. This accomplishment cost us only eight men killed and 37 wounded. Up to this point the following number of patients were evacuated; 19 with malaria; eight with other fevers (mostly dengue); 10 with psycho-neurosis; and 33 injured. Miscellaneous sicknesses totaled 109. Of the 2997 men who had started up the Ledo Road a month before, 2651 continued to carry on.

One unfortunate incident occurred on the

7th of March. The men from the first platoon of C Company in Maj. Ghiz's Red Combat Team from the First Battalion were disposed along the river east of Wesu Ga when they were fired upon from across the stream. They returned fire immediately and got their mortars into action. The noise brought a Chinese interpreter to the scene. As it seemed improbable that there were enemy forces in the vicinity, the interpreter called across the river and learned that the troops firing on Red Combat Team were Chinese. Firing ceased at once, and the Americans quickly crossed the stream to see if any casualties had resulted. They found four men, including a major, badly wounded. American doctors were rushed to the scene, and men from Red Combat Team carried the injured Chinese to the air strip from where the wounded were evacuated.

A Chinese lieutenant explained that his men had fired upon Red Combat Team because they mistook the American helmets for Japanese. Unfortunately, this same error recurred during the succeeding months despite the efforts which liaison officers took to prevent its repetition.

At 1845 hours on March 7th, General Merrill held a staff meeting at which he informed the assembled officers that the first phase of Galahad's operations had ended. He also rescinded his order to move southward and cut the Kamaing Road at Chanmoi because the 38th Chinese Division was now choking all trails in that direction, and any American movement would only add to the congestion. Merrill conveyed to his officers General Stilwell's congratulations for a job well done, and requested them to relay the message to their men. A three-day rest period, he announced, was now in order.

During the next three days the men of Galahad cleaned and overhauled their equipment, making repairs and replacements wherever necessary. The Americans and nearby Chinese troops set up a joint perimeter around Sana Ga and Khikau Ga. The two groups exchanged rations, battle souvenirs and money, and went swimming together. Morale among the men was superb. General Sun, commander of the 38th Chinese Division, also congratulated Merrill on the success of Galahad's operations, and the cordial relationship which already existed between the Chinese and American forces was strengthened.

On the 10th of March, in response to radio instructions, Merrill went to Maingkwan where General Stilwell had set up temporary headquarters. Scattered enemy groups still occupied the 16 miles over which General Merrill rode to reach Maingkwan, but he and the part of 25 that accompanied

(Continued on page 3)

Officer's Row

Executive Secretary — We have received many replies supporting the publication of the "Burman News," many with donations to keep us going for the present. An issue costs us approximately \$650 for printing, postage and computer hours. So that is where your money goes. Keep those donations coming!

Matlovich has sent me a reunion notice form for the VFW with the suggestion that the news be released to other magazines as well. Okay, so I volunteered for this job. Send me the names and addresses of these magazines, newspapers or whatever and I will send them a news release.

Letters

Dear Sir:

12-10-84

While all this was going on back in '44 and part of '45, I wished I could have been somewhere else but since it is over, I am happy to have been a part of it.

John D. Johnston, 1st Bn.

Gentlemen:

I thoroughly enjoy the "Burman News" and would like to continue to receive it.

I trust that support for the "News" will be adequate enough for it to continue publishing.

Victor Granato, 2nd Bn, Blue, CT

FALL IN!

Here are the latest additions to our assembly. Remember them?

ISRAEL ADDINGTON, 209 Engrs/B Co, 5409 Old Providence Rd., Virginia Beach, VA 23464
 JACK BLOMBERG, 5307/3/0, Star Rte, Box 96A, Isle, MN 56342
 FRANK M. BREYER, 475/612, 12722 W 12th Lane, Houston, TX 77099
 WILSON H. PAUL, 475th, 15216 Long Oak Dr., Houston, TX 77070
 GERALD J. WIDOFF, HQ/5307/475/5332 BDE, 128 Central Park So., Suite 5D, New York, NY 10019
 WILLIAM WESTER, Liaison Pilot, 3490 Ninth Dr., Baker, OR 97814
 FRANK BEFERA, 475th 10 Observation Rd., Duluth, MN 55811
 JOHN R. GRAY, 5307, 5540 - 43rd Ave. So., Minneapolis, MN 55417
 WESLEY A. JAMIESON, 475th, 1221 - 20th St., NW, East Grand Forks, MN 56721
 ROBERT A. MILLS, 613/B Bat, 16811 Scenic Lane, Minnetonka, MN 55353
 EUGENE J. WEINANDT, 236th Engrs, Box 193, Madison Lake, MN 56063
 OLIVER E. HALSTENSON, 209th Engrs, Box 324, Walnut Grove, MN 56180
 NELSON MAYHEW, 5307/Hq/MP, P.O. Box 383, Gretna, VA 24557.



PASS IN REVIEW

Deaths reported December 1984 and January 1985

Name and Hometown [where known]	Where, When Died
EDGAR J. BRYNER, Vienna, Va., 5307/1/R/A; 475/1/A	1/8/85
ROBERT H. BARTELL, Chicago, Ill., 5307/1/R; 475/1	3/8/84
RUSSELL R. FULLER, Canaan, Vt., 5307/1/R	1984
ALBERT GLUNT, Darragh, Pa., Mule Skinner	9/24/84
GOMER S. HAWK, Sunbury, Pa 5307/1/R	Sao Paulo, Brazil 7/9/84
LT. COL. TED HUGHES, JR., Lunenburg, Mass., 5307/3/0	9/11/84
CHARLES S. McDONOUGH, Sugar Run, Pa., 475/K	August 1984
CAPT. McMASTERS (hometown not known) 5307/C.O. Co. K	KIA Myitkyina 1944
JOHN J. PISIAK, Syracuse, N.Y.	11/19/83
ARTHUR J. RICHARDS, Sr., Scranton, Pa., 5307/2/B	10/19/84
T/SGT. JOSEPH H. THOMASON, Livermore, KY., 475th	9/5/78
PHILIP S. WELD, Gloucester, Mass. 5307/1	11/6/84
ED WHACKLER (hometown not known), 475th	KIA Burma 1944-45
RICHARD E. YOUNG, Stoughton, Mass., 5307/1/A, Air Drop	Las Vegas, Nevada 1/3/85

Scottsdale Reunion — 1984

Photos by Hyden



Feb 85

FATHER STUART...

(Continued from page 1)

him made the trip without incident.

On the following day, March 11, General Merrill held a staff conference at Sana Ga, and outlined to his officers the plan for the second phase of their operations.

**The Second Phase of the Campaign
Shaduzup**

The Japanese 18th Division, headquarters were at Kamaing, (a small town on the Mogaung River, 25 miles north of Mogaung). It was the seat of the political officer for the Hukawng Valley and Jade Mine Area. It had an all-weather motor road connecting it with the railroad at Mogaung. The population of Kamaing was Kachin, Burman, Shan, Indian and Chinese. It was something like Marguerita, in Assam, (but with a greater mixture of races). Japanese were yielding slowly to Chinese pressure between Walawbum and Jambu Bum (short, steep hill five miles south of Yinkawk on the main Ledo Road) and were being crowded toward the narrow pass that separates the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys. In line with General Stilwell's plans, Galahad's new mission was to thrust deep to the enemy's rear, cut his supply and communication lines, and harass his main body by attacking from unexpected quarters.

To accomplish this mission successfully, the strategy was to strike at two points along the axis and establish road blocks, pinch out hostile elements between them, and then to attack in either direction or both as the situation warranted. To insure a maximum of effectiveness for the Marauders, the 113th regiment from the 38th Chinese Division was made available for the operation. These Chinese troops would take over the blocks that would be established, leaving the Marauders free to pursue and exploit any opening the maneuver might uncover.

One Galahad battalion, followed by one regiment of Chinese, was to proceed almost due south of Jambu Bum, and then turn west to cut the Kamaing Road. The rest of the Galahad unit would make a wide detour via Pabum and head south through the Tanai Valley to the vicinity of Hsamshingyang where it would turn west to strike the Kamaing Road south of the first block.

Once the two road blocks were established, the Chinese troops would hold them while the Marauders, working from the north and south would close the pincers on the enemy caught between the two points. The Chinese 22nd Division, continuing its push from north of Jambu Bum, was expected to drive on down into the Mogaung Valley.

The First Battalion was badly disappointed as they thought they had played a rather minor role at Walawbum. Many of its men had not yet looked at the enemy through the sights of their weapons. Lt. Col. Osborne, in command of the First Battalion, requested and received assignment of the first mission which was to cut the road near Shaduzup (ten miles north of Warazup). You may remember the more northerly of the two Mogaung Hka bridges, one at Warazup and this one at Shaduzup)

where an enemy position was located.

On March 12th the First Battalion moved out, and that day covered nine miles to Shingboi Ga. On the next day they marched 12 miles to Makuy Bum. The 113th Regiment of the 38th Chinese Division was following a day behind.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Maj. Johnson's White CT was feeling out the trail several miles in advance of the main column. Lt. Samuel V. Wilson was in charge of this platoon. Finding fresh enemy footprints, Wilson and his men redoubled their caution and contrived to slip up unobserved on a group of Japanese sitting around fires just off the narrow jungle path. The platoon opened fire. They killed four Japanese and one Burman, but stirred up a veritable hornet's nest. The enemy proved to be 150 strong, and the platoon was quickly dispersed into the jungle. Retreating up the trail, one of the Marauders encountered Lt. William C. Evans, in charge of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon from Red Ct of the First Battalion. Evans, after sending a report of the situation back to the main column, hastened with his platoon to Wilson's assistance.

A rifle platoon under Lt. John P. McElmurry also rushed forward to help Wilson's platoon, and the combined forces drove the Japanese across the nearby Tingrung Hka (river). McElmurry seized commanding ground on the far side of the river and provided a bridgehead for the main body of the battalion to cross safely. Although they were attacked, they successfully held off the enemy with only one man killed, as McElmurry had chosen a good position and had firmly established it. The battalion spent the night at this point.

This incident had disclosed the forward movement of the Americans to the enemy. On the following day, March 15th, the Marauders fought eight separate engagements during the first mile and a half covered. Lt. Evans and his platoon were in the lead during these engagements, and bore the brunt of the enemy assaults.

The Japanese displayed considerable skill in the employment of weapons and in taking advantage of the terrain. Throughout this section of the jungle, growth was so dense that, once off the trail, men could easily get lost within ten feet of each other.

Here, for the first time, the Marauders encountered the efficient S-shaped machine gun formation which the Japanese used so effectively for trail blocking. The enemy technique was to pin down the lead squad with machine gun fire, then throw mortar shells behind the squad so fast that the troops following had difficulty in supporting it. Every time the Marauders got mortars into action against the Japanese machine guns, and made an enveloping movement through the thick growth beside the trail, the enemy displaced 100 to 500 yards to repeat his delaying tactics. The Japanese were armed with both light and heavy machine guns, and were apparently the same group that Lt. Wilson had encountered the night before.

Unknown to the Marauders, this Japanese force was opposed in its rear by a group of irregular Kachin guerillas under

Lt. James L. Tilly, age 21, from Denver, Colorado. (He was in our group and had 200 of my men. Combat headquarters had asked for action in this area and were informed daily of all Kachin movements. There was no reason why Osborne should not have been informed. The Kachins knew of the presence of Americans. Tilly didn't believe them, as we were never informed of American movements. Tilly's men, to convince him, went out and pinched American rations and cigarettes and presented them to him. Tilly and his men established ambushes to the east of the Japanese force which was, as a result, kept bouncing from attack on one side to attack on the other. The enemy suffered casualties from each action.

It was extremely unfortunate that Osborne did not know about the Kachin group

(Continued on page 4)

Marsmen in Burma

Mrs. John Randolph, 288 Bryn Mawr Circle, Houston, TX 77024, has advised us that she is considering having her late husband's book reprinted. She would like to hear from people who are serious about acquiring a copy. It will cost her \$5,000 to print 150 copies. Depending on the number ordered the price could range from \$100 to \$33 per copy if all 150 copies are sold. Please advise Mrs. Randolph of your interest, and limit on what you would be willing to pay. The book covers both the 124th Cavalry and 475th Infantry during the Training at Camp Landis, and the Central Burma Campaign. Lots of photos included and maps of combat areas.

**Dave Quaid
Video Cassette**

We have had a good response for orders for this tape of the 3rd Bn, 5307th, movement over the mountains toward Myitkyina. Not having a video tape player ourselves, we made a mistake in not knowing and not telling you to specify whether you needed VHS or BETA type tape. Will those persons who have previously placed orders write again to tell us their needs? We have had a problem in getting the tapes released. Therefore, we have not cashed any of the checks and will not until we are sure that they are in the mail.

Hey, Medics!

Lee Vineyard, from the 3rd Bn, 603 S Mechanic, Marion, IL 62959, has been seriously ill, now feeling better.

Floyd F. Mauney, 475th, permanently disabled, is in VA Medical Center, Ward 1-W, Hampton, VA 23669.

Col. William L. Osborne, CO, 1st Bn 5307, 475th and 124th Cav. has been reported as "Not in good shape lately." 1084 Presid Rd., Pebble Beach, CA 92953.

Remember them? I'm sure you do. Is the time to say so with a card friendly note.

FATHER STUART . . .

(Continued from page 3)

on the other side of the Japanese. Unaware of their presence which would have greatly aided him in breaking the trail block, and faced with a determined enemy, he could only foresee a delay which would prevent his reaching the Kamaing Road on schedule. He knew that his schedule must be maintained in order to coordinate with the efforts of the Second and Third Battalions operating farther south, so he decided to cut a trail around the opposing Japanese force.

Osborne pulled Maj. Johnson's White CT back a short distance, leaving Maj. Ghiz' Red CT to keep the Japanese occupied. It was late evening and little could be accomplished in darkness. But at dawn on March 16th, White CT started chopping a path through the jungle toward Kumshan Gahtawng. Red CT kept in contact with the enemy until late that afternoon, then pulled back and — together with the 113th Chinese regiment which had caught up with them during the day — followed the trail cut by White CT.

An airdrop of supplies was required by the time the First Battalion reached Kumshan Gahtawng. Here the country was extremely mountainous, but the battalion picked the best available spot, cleared and improved it to a semblance of a dropping field. However, when the transports came over, so much time was consumed in locating the field that further delay to make the drop would have run their gasoline supply dangerously low. The pilots returned to

(Continued on page 5)

**HEADQUARTERS
5307TH COMPOSITE UNIT [PROVISIONAL]**

A.P.O.
884, c/o PM, New York, N.Y.
15 January 1944

SPECIAL ORDER

:

NUMBER 7)

1. Having reported this sta in compliance with ltr order Hqs Base Secon #2 SCS, CBI, APO 465, dtd 10 Jan. 1944, the following named O & EM are asgd to units indicated:

Hq & Hq Det. 5307th Composite Unit [Prov]

T/Sgt Wofford, John B. 38088791, QMC 713; S/Sgt McCown, Woodrow A 38088612, QMC 821; S/Sgt Reed, Luke A. 38300559, QMC 710; T/4 Casey, Edward F. 32189945, QMC 060; Cpl Ward, John E. 13016782, QMC 712; Cpl Williams, Robert M. 38102437, QMC 405; T/5 Corbin, Marvin C. 6295608, QMC 192; T/5 Hancock, Jason T. 37390149, QMC 712; T/5 Quijada, Jose P. 39160203, QMC 060;

Pfc Bergerson, Eugene J. 36267919, QMC 712; Pfc Ferguson, Robert A. 38060978, QMC 712; Pfc Fett, Robert C. 36272129, QMC 712; Pfc Gal-loway, Arnold A. 38109970, QMC 712; Pfc Gau-reaux, Pershing J. 38260165, QMC 712; Pfc Hernandez, Isabel (NMI) 38224315, QMC 712; Pfc Kummer, William Jr. 36291970, QMC 712; Pfc Lichte, Arthur F. 37308358, QMC 712; Pfc Lindgren, Leonard L. 37432329, QMC 712; Pfc Sims, Herman B. 38230906, QMC 712; Pfc Unter-reiner, Raymond A. 37056567, QMC 712; Pvt Fackrell, John W. 37453374, QMC 094; Pvt Gib-son, Roy W. 35258834, QMC 093; Pvt Haley, Woodrow L. 38230412, QMC 712.

Hq & Hq Co., 1st Battalion

1st Lt Gumaer, Kenneth I 01715248, VC; S/Sgt Gailius, Mike (NMI) 36426152, QMC 711; T/5 Drugotch, George (NMI) 33460786, VC 250; T/5 Trappen, Francis J. 6851428, QMC 093; Pfc Carroll, James P. 32521247, QMC 565; Pfc Colvin, Ross A. 37056246, QMC 712; Pfc Rhodes, William K. 37056416, QMC 235; Pvt Armstrong, Rudy (NMI) 35562470, QMC 712;

Pvt Buckland, Wayne C. 35637751, QMC 712; Pvt Hinton, Robert B. 17109228, QMC 712; Pvt Martinex, Eufemio E. 37253803, QMC 094; Pvt Martinez, Joe N. 37353785, QMC 712; Pvt Peter-man, Arthur E 37230010, QMC 712; Pvt Riley, Robert M. 39318992, QMC 712; Pvt Snowden, Grant (NMI) 35464803, QMC 712; Pvt Stoddard, Arthur G 32551241, QMC 590.

Hq & Hq Co., 2nd Battalion

1st Lt. Craig, Newton V. 0465508, QMC; 1st Sgt Kesler, John W. Jr. 34130865, QMC 585; S/Sgt Jackson, Robert E. 37230344, QMC 711; S/Sgt Lewis, Joseph H. 16054089, QMC 824; S/Sgt Schorum, Elmer (NMI) 36380617, QMC 711; T/4 Halsey, Gerald E. 35115728, QMC 094; T/4 Mead, Victor M 39376014, QMC 094; T/5 Bieler, David (NMI) 37432776, QMC 712; T/5 Lee, Darwin H. 3468549, VC 250; T/5 Miller, Clyde E. 38251840, QMC 192; Pfc Addington, Alton E. 37006323, QMC 712; Pfc Beaman, Virgil M 37432373, QMC 712; Pfc Carnahan, William A. 36373939, QMC 712; Pfc Castro, Jesus (NMI) 39602396, QMC 712;

Pfc Davis, Shirley O. 37230336, QMC 712; Pfc Ferguson, Tony E. 19071061, QMC 697; Pfc Hol-lenback, Lester L. 36437755, QMC 094; Pfc Webb, Maston E., Jr. 38425368, QMC 192; Pvt Ban, Mathew James 6079708, QMC 712; Pvt Barnett, William W. 34393043, QMC 712; Pvt Chambers, Walter E. 36434227, QMC 712; Pvt DeNigro, Dominick P. 32668121, QMC 712; Pvt Diecker, Joseph J. 36428715, QMC 712; Pvt Mal-latt, Claude W. 37229860, QMC 712; Pvt Holder, John N. 34359303, QMC 712; Pvt Nash, William (NMI) 39255129, QMC 712; Pvt Neemann, Elmer D 37266804, QMC 712; Pvt Rhoads, John I. 37232173, QMC 712; Pvt Schwartz, Matthew (NMI) 33577688, QMC 521.

Hq & Hq Co., 3rd Battalion

S/Sgt Lebsock, Ruben C. 38085601, QMC 711; T/5 Armour, Charles E., Jr. 34084361, QMC 192; T/5 Burns, Reuben E. 36265143, QMC 712; T/5 Yatson, John (NMI) 33421728, VC 250; Pfc Hodge, Delbert L. 18191896, QMC 712; Pfc Johnson, Carl F. 36426138, QMC 712; Pfc Mc-Gregor, Leeman C. 37390192, QMC 712; Pvt Blank, George H. 37266967, QMC 712; Pvt Cam-eron, Charles L. 15334052, QMC 712; Pvt Gutierrez, Manuel G. 38253467, QMC 712;

Pvt Morris, Eugene (NMI) 37215242, QMC 345; Pvt Oldenburg, Orville K. 36362171, QMC 712; Pvt Porteous, Lyle B. 36703346, QMC 712; Pvt Sanchez, Geronimo (NMI) 38252059, QMC 712; Pvt. Wright, George W. 38231811, QMC 712.

2. Pursuant to authority contained in AR 610-10, as amended the following Officers, this Unit, are appointed Examining Board for the purpose of examining applicants for Warrant Officer (JG) as appear before them:

Charles N. Hunter 017710, Inf. Lt. Col. (President); Edward T. Hancock 0330192, Inf. Major; Robert O. Gardiner 01286631, Inf. 1st Lt. (Recorder).

3. UP AR 615-5, as amended, Pfc Frank G. Kelley, 33288345, Hq & Hq Det, 5307th Composite Unit (Prov), is promoted to the gr of

Corporal (temporary).

4. UP AR 615-200 the following named EM units indicated are trfd in gr to Hq & Hq Det, 5307th Composite Unit (Prov):

Pvt Joseph C. Brown 11011337, Hq Co, 1st Bn; Pvt Harold W. Delashmit 17160883, Hq Co, 1st Bn.

5. UP AR 615-5, as amended, the following promotions are announced in Hq & Hq Det, 5307th Composite Unit (Prov):

To be Master Sergeant [Temporary]

S/Sgt Clifford J. Mason 20684433.

To be Corporal [Temporary]

Pvt Joseph C. Brown 11011337; Pvt Ray C. Jackson 37153702; Pfc John R. Turri 2041044.

To be Technician 5th Grade [Temporary]

Pfc Sebastian (NMI) Curti 32246275.

17. UP AR 615-5, as amended, Sgt John L. Darling 6980548, Hq & Hq Det, 5307th Composite Unit (Prov), is reduced to gr of Private for misconduct.

18. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads, "Lt Col McGee, George A. 020806" amended to read "Lt Col McGee, George A. J. 020806."

19. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Capt Lyons Frederick O., 0417377" amended to read "Capt Lyons, Frederick O. 0414377."

20. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "2nd Lt Whaley, Bert L., 0573745 (AC)" amended to read "2nd Lt Whaley, Bert L. Jr 0573745 (AC)."

21. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Capt Healey, Richard M., 0-25275" amended to read "Capt. Healey, Richard W. 025275."

22. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Pfc Snowden, Earnest T. W. 35479379" amended to read "Pfc Snowden, Earnest T. W. 35469379."

23. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Pfc Ray, Charles H., 20943652" amended to read "Pvt Ray, Charles H. 20943652."

24. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "1st Lt Cramer, Neil (NMI), 0-888241" amended to read "1st Lt Cramer, Neil F. 0888241."

25. The following Officers are reld fr further assignment and dy with Co Y, 3rd Bn, and are assigned to Hq & Hq Co, 3rd Bn:

1st Lt Cramer, Neil F. 0888241, Inf.; 2nd Lt Duncan, William Z. 01318146, Inf.

26. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Capt Petito, Peter A., 0369202" amended to read "Capt Petito, Peter A. 0369209."

27. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "1st Lt Thompson, Larue, (NMI) 0-1698852" is amended to read "1st Lt Thompson, Larue E., 01698852."

28. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "S/Sgt Bowser, George F., 20646887" amended to read "S/Sgt Bowser, George J. 20646887."

29. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Pfc Burgoo, David J., 37229218" amended to read "Pfc Burgoon, David J. 37229218."

30. So much of Par 2, SO #3, this Hq es, reads "Pfc Worsnop, Leslie R., 20503107" amended to read "Pfc Worsnop, Leslie R. 20503107."

33. UP AR 615-5, as amended, Cpl Adolph Koztara, 13012297 Co B, 1st Bn, is reduced to grade of Private (without prejudice).

FATHER STUART . . .

Continued from page 4)

base after advising the Marauders that they would return the next morning.

The Marauders continued to improve the field, and when the planes returned the following day, the drop was made. However, because of encircling hills, the transports unloaded from a high altitude and much of the free dropped grain was lost. Some of the parachutes floated over a nearby hill, but all were searched out and their loads secured.

As soon as the supplies were packed, the First Battalion took up the march and pushed forward vigorously. Everyone, including officers, took turns at the arduous task of hewing and chopping through the jungle. But in two days they only succeeded in wearing down a total distance of four miles.

By nightfall of March 18th, the battalion reached a point two miles northwest of Jaiwa Ga. A Battalion was then six miles away from Tanpan, Merrill's headquarters on the 19th and they were connected by a good road. It would have been better had all three battalions come via Nawbum to Tanpan and then separated. The two road blocks and the work of our Kachins could have been coordinated. As it was, Osborne traveled blindly and lost time. It was at Jaiwa Ga they made contact with the 50 Kachins under Lt. Tilly who provided guides for the rest of the march toward Shaduzup.

Meanwhile, General Merrill was temporarily at Weilangyang. On the morning of March 19th, Osborne sent his battalion S-3, Capt. Thomas B. Senff (who had a very good reputation with both officers and men) to report their status to the General and receive any further instructions which Merrill might have. The battalion kept pushing over difficult trails and on March 20th reached Nprawa where they ran into a Japanese trail block.

At this block, one Marauder was killed and two were wounded. As the lead scouts plodded along the trail, their Kachin guides became suddenly voluble. No interpreter being handy, the Americans nonchalantly ascribed the natives "jabbering" to a desire for food or cigarettes, and provided the Kachins with both. Actually, the Kachins had announced that a Nambu (Japanese machine gun) positions lay directly ahead, and they assumed that food and cigarettes were rewards for giving the Americans this information. The location of this enemy machine gun was soon disclosed. Luckily, the Japanese were too impetuous in opening fire on the scouts. Had they waited, more American troops would have been caught in their field of fire, and the Japanese would undoubtedly have caused many casualties. (Col. Osborane blamed Tilly for this, and was possibly correct. Tilly should have been there himself even though he didn't know the language well. He was used to Kachins and could have made out what was wrong. He was a good boy, but young, and his position alone with Kachins left him too much freedom of action. (He was a fine character, but acted more like a boy of 16 than an officer of 21. The Kachins loved him.)

This incident offered a sound lesson to the

Marauders. Thereafter, native remarks were interpreted.

Mortar fire quickly reduced the trail block, and the march proceeded. On March 21st, a five-day supply drop was picked up in a rice paddy near Hyengnankawng, and that same day the leading Red CT reached Hpauchye Ga. On the following day, March 22nd, the lead patrol ran into a Japanese ambush which scored one Marauder killed, two wounded. A short distance farther along the trail another block was encountered, apparently manned by the same enemy group that had set up the ambush. Lt. Harry B. Coburn, commanding the leading platoon of Red Ct, deduced that the enemy intended to employ the same delaying tactics which they had used before, and he decided to cut a trail around the block.

A nearby stream bed suited his purpose. Cutting a path much of the way, the platoon followed the stream for about four miles until advance scouts detected an enemy position ahead. The platoon crept forward cautiously and opened fire, killing seven Japanese who were taking their ease beside well-made foxholes. Coburn's platoon took over the position for a brief rest during which the enemy returned in more force and attacked. However, the position was so well chosen that the Americans quickly dispersed the attack with additional Japanese casualties.

From this point, reconnaissance was made along the trail on which the Marauders proposed to advance. Another ambush was located on this trail and by-passed, but further reconnoitering disclosed blocks on every trail in the area. As Osborne considered it highly important for the First Battalion to have as little contact with the enemy as possible in order to preserve the element of surprise at Shaduzup, he again decided to forsake the trails, and to cut his own path cross country.

During the next two days, March 23rd and 24th, the going was so strenuous and difficult that frequently loads had to be taken off the animals and manhandled up mountain sides. Time and again passage through the almost impenetrable growth was achieved only by painfully and slowly hacking out a path. However, Osborne was successful in maintaining secrecy regarding the battalion's movement. No Japanese were encountered.

From Lt. Tilly, Osborne had learned that the Japanese held Shaduzup strongly. He decided, therefore, to deceive the enemy by sending one platoon to make a feint directly toward the town.

Accordingly, Lt. McElmurry led one rifle platoon along a trail leading to Hkahku Gahtawng. Just before entering this village, they surprised two enemy soldiers who were evidently a reconnaissance party since they carried only maps and sketching equipment. Both of those men dropped as the Marauders fired, but a moment later one of them leaped to his feet and disappeared into the underbrush. McElmurry passed on through Hkahku Gathawng which soon afterward became a mortar target for the Japanese who continued to throw shells at the village throughout the night. This maneuver undoubtedly contributed to the complete surprise that, on the

next day, attended the First Battalion's arrival at a point farther south on the Kamaing Road.

Osborne had decided to place his road block where the Mogaung Hka (river) at its confluence with the Chengun Hka (river) makes a U bend. At this spot, which is approximately four and one-half miles south of Shaduzup, the river runs parallel to the road. On the night of March 26th, the First Battalion bivouacked on the bank of the Chengun Hka (river) ten miles from its junction with the Mogaung Hka (river). (McGee's road block was on the 25th at Inkangahtawng.) The next day, often wading downstream to avoid cutting trails, the Marauders made their way south to within a mile of their objective.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Maj. Johnson's White CT reported Japanese bathing and grenading fish in the Mogaung Hka (river), apparently present in the area in large numbers. There appeared to be an enemy camp west of the Mogaung Hka (river) in a position which lay east of the road. Further scouting revealed that at least one Japanese company was installed in this camp, and that there was another and larger camp a little further to the south. Also noted was the fact that the enemy had large quantities of food and clothing stored in bashas or under canvas covers.

Using this information and still confident that the Japanese were unaware of the Marauders' presence, Osborne planned a surprise night attack.

Three points to cross the Mogaung Hka (river) were selected, and from these the three columns would converge upon the Japanese camp. Three additional columns, following the first three closely, would be sent either to add impetus to the shock, whereever resistance might be met, or to fill any gap that might develop in the American lines. These second three columns could also, if necessary, be used for flanking operations or to meet any supporting enemy force that might be rushed up from the Japanese camp farther south.

Maj. Johnson's White CT was organized into six platoon-strength parties who were carefully instructed in what line the operation would follow. At 0300 hours, White CT moved silently out and cautiously waded the Mogaung Hka (river). Maj. Ghiz's Red CT covered the east bank of the river to their rear, while the Chinese 113th Regiment remained in readiness to take over White CT's position on a hill about a mile to the northwest.

Not one Japanese sentry was encountered as the six platoon columns of White CT crept into position. Dawn broke. Small fires began to crackle as early risers in the unsuspecting Japanese camp started to prepare breakfast. Suddenly the attack order was given by SCR 536 and 300 radio. With fixed bayonets, the Marauders swept through the camp.(1).

(1) This surprise was almost fantastic. The Marauder column choked the narrow stream bed for a distance of fully three miles beginning at a point one mile from where the Chengun Hka (river) flows into the Mogaung Hka (river). Behind them pressed the 113th Chinese Regiment. It is difficult to conceive of an alert military body being so blissfully unaware of impending danger under the existing conditions as were the Japanese.

FATHER STUART . . .

(Continued from page 5)

The dismay and panic of the Japanese were complete. Naked or half-dressed, they scattered in all directions. Those with weapons fired wild, ineffectual shots. Many of the enemy fell before the Marauders' bayonets and exploding grenades; others made a grisly harvest for Tommy guns.

The platoon led by Lt. Meredith Caldwell, Jr., was the first to reach the Kamaing Road, and these men immediately dug in a protective perimeter which constituted the road block that was their objective. Later, they changed into clean underwear which had been found in a captured enemy truck, and devoured the rice and fish that had been left cooking on the little breakfast fires.

The expected counter-attack was not long in coming. By 0700 hours Japanese snipers were very active, and all further digging in of positions, although not discontinued, became difficult. By 0900 hours, Japanese artillery opened up on Red CT's position on the east bank of the river.

Preliminary reconnaissance parties had not uncovered the presence of enemy artillery. By good chance the American perimeter was set so close to the rise in ground behind which the enemy gun positions were located that for the time being the Marauders were masked and not a vulnerable target. However, by 1000 hours the Japanese managed to get another battery from further north zeroed in, and soon 77 and 150 mm shells came pouring in on the Marauders' position.

This stab at the rear of the Japanese seriously diverted their attention from the 22nd Chinese Division's advance down the road from Walawbum. Enemy troops were hurriedly pulled back from up the road to help cope with this new threat to their rear, thus permitting the Chinese to push forward more rapidly under slackening Japanese resistance. After several concerted attacks, the Chinese reached Jambu Bum, only a few miles north of the Marauders' road block.

Caught between the two Allied forces, the Japanese made a frenzied effort to extricate themselves. By mid-day White CT's perimeter received an attack from the north which was turned back with heavy losses to the enemy. At 1300 hours another attack developed from the west, supported by artillery. But by this time the Marauders had developed an excellent final protective line with interlocking bands of automatic fire which the Japanese were unable to penetrate. All that afternoon the enemy attacked in varying strength, nearly always from different quarters, and each time the Marauders repulsed them after inflicting heavy casualties.

Lt. McElmurry and Lt. Charles Scott (later in Det. 101, and wounded at Shwegu, south of Bhamo) crouched in a fox-hole together during one of the attacks. McElmurry called Scott's attention to a Japanese officer who appeared on the road. But Scott had also seen the officer and shot him dead while McElmurry was drawing a bead. In the next half hour, twelve Japanese were picked off while attempting to retrieve the officer's body.

The assaults tapered off in late afternoon, but all that night enemy artillery pounded both the road block and Red CT's position across the river. Trucks bringing Japanese reinforcements were heard coming up the road from the direction of Kamaing. Being without artillery, the Marauders resorted to using their mortars and to throwing grenades whenever they heard a suspicious sound along their front.

The position of the Marauders was now firmly established. Following the plan of operations, the 113th Chinese Regiment moved in and took over just before dawn on March 29th. When the Chinese opened up with their pack artillery, the enemy quieted down. By 1000 hours, Osborne's First Battalion had withdrawn about a mile up the Chengun Hka (river) to a point where a Seagrave hospital unit had, meanwhile, been set up. The weary American troops rested, enjoyed the music of opposing Chinese and Japanese artillery fire from just over the hill.

By now the Japanese had lost more than 300 men, and during the day they withdrew. One battalion of the 113th Chinese Regiment followed the retreating enemy approximately a mile farther south to Laban. At 1500 hours, on March 29th, patrols from this Chinese Division battalion met patrols from the 22nd Chinese Division pushing down from the north, and the Ledo Road was declared open to Laban.

This battle had cost the First Battalion five men killed and 35 wounded.

On the next day, March 30th, the First Battalion left the Seagrave unit and started to back-track up to Chengun Hka (river). The going was extremely difficult. Rain poured down intermittently, and the battalion's radios failed to operate. General Merrill's instructions to Osborne were to rejoin the rest of the unit, which would probably be near Hsamshingyang, as soon as practicable after accomplishing his mission. On the evening of March 30th, Osborne received a radio to proceed to Janpan by easy stages. (I wonder how long this message took. B Btn. were then cut off and there should have been more urgency in the message than "easy stages.") The route became increasingly rugged. At times in a day's march of ten hours they covered but a mile and a half. (All the officers and men had the highest respect for Col. Osborne. Col. Hunter thought him the best battalion commanding officer. He did well with Mars Task Force too. During this particular phase of the campaign he was always getting slowed down by wrong trails. Still he got a Legion of Merit for Capt. Darlington who was guide and "knew" the country.) CAPT JACK 'A BR

During an air-drop on April 1st, a sack of grain smashed into the battalion's only long-range radio (2) instrument, putting it out of commission. Unit ingenious mechanics succeeded in repairing the machine three days later, the battalion was out of communication with headquarters. On

April 3rd Osborne, worried over being out of contact with General Merrill, went Shaduzup where the Chinese head-quarters had a radio hook-up with the Galahad headquarters. At Shaduzup Osborne received a extremely urgent message: The First Battalion was to make all haste to Hsamshingyang. (Simultaneously, this message was also received at Jampan by the First Battalion's radio operator who had at last succeeded in repairing his machine.) (OSS radio set-up was excellent, but Osborne had no OSS man with him then. On the trek to Myitkyina, OSS kept their own radio with the troops and were in constant contact with the base.)

The battalion had already covered a mile and a half that day, and an air-drop was due. As soon as their dropped supplies had been picked up, the Marauders started out and by evening of the following day, April 4th, they had advanced seven miles to Kadungukawng. On April 5th, they had seven miles more to Sintawngkawng. (April 6th, while waiting for an air-drop in the late afternoon, the First Battalion picked up another message: The Second Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting at Nhpum Ga, the Third Battalion was attempting to reach the Second in order to extricate them, and both badly needed support from the First Battalion.

At 1845 hours, the First Battalion forged ahead again, making five and a half miles under the worst conditions yet encountered. At this time, Capt. Senff took command of Red CT. VICE M&G HTZ

On Good Friday, April 7th, at 1700 hours the almost exhausted First Battalion pulled into Hsamshingyang. (We were all glad to see them. I had Mass for the Catholics (as many non-Catholics) on Saturday and again on Sunday. (Their chaplain was not Catholic). After a brief orientation from Col. Hunter, commanding the Marauders there, Capt. Senff was directed to select from Red CT, 250 men physically able to make another hard march to begin early the next morning.

Inkangahtawng

When the First Battalion pulled out of Shinkau Ga and Wesu Ga at 0700 hours on March 12th, the Second Battalion also left the trail for Pabum. At 0800 hours the command group followed the Second Battalion and the Third Battalion brought up the rear of this column, getting underway at 10 hours.

After marching several miles, the column was halted because the lead mule had become mired in a stream crossing. This necessitated building a corduroy bottom in the stream bed with bamboo poles. Despite this delay, by 1600 hours the Second and Third Battalions covered 16 miles to Gal Ga.

Until recently, the village of Galun had been occupied by the Japanese. But upon learning of the situation at Walawbum, they had burned most of it and departed suddenly, leaving foxholes and slit trenches that were still fresh. (Our boys took the village in January when they killed five Japs.)

During the next two days, March 13th and 14th, the Marauders reached Pabum a

Continued on page 7

(2) Throughout Galahad's operations, the SCR 300 radio was extremely valuable for small groups in communicating with each other and with battalion headquarters. The SCR 336, used for giving mortar targets at very short range, was never satisfactory for distances of over a few hundred yards. Normal communications between battalions was carried on by SCR 284 radios, but often the efficient SCR 300 did the job for the SCR 284.

FATHER STUART . . .

(Continued from page 6)

headed south. They covered 25 miles of mountainous trail, stopping only long enough to pick up an air drop. On the 15th of March, the column reached Naubum where it was met by Capt. Vincent Curl of the OSS. (He was nominal head of our group. He took no interest in the work, which was mostly delegated. He was illiterate to the extent that he couldn't write long hand. He would send me notes in big baby-block letters. He was a commissioned army sergeant. He was very decent and allowed me an absolute free hand with the Kachins. His trust in the Kachins to do his work was amply repaid. They did better by him than a more able officer who was always interfering. As our set-up worked, he was ideal. He let me and Zinghtung Naw . . . run the show.) Curl was working with a force of Kachin guerillas whom he used to harass the enemy and to obtain information.

This particular group of Kachins had been instrumental in saving several flyers who had been forced down in that territory. Because of their ability to slip through the jungle rapidly and their knowledge of the trails, they proved of inestimable value to the Marauders. Against the Japanese, the Kachins were vicious fighters, but they were amicably disposed toward Americans (an attitude for which Father James Stuart . . ., a Catholic missionary who had lived among the Kachins for years, was responsible. The friendly relations which Father Stuart had built up with the natives made possible the work of the OSS. The priest also met the Marauders, and arranged to hold Mass for those men who wanted it).

(Wednesday, March 15th — Two battalions of American troops known as the "Galahad Forces" or "Merrill's Marauders" arrived today at Naubum. I brought some Kachins along to improve the road in places to allow their transport mules to pass. I met Gen. Merrill, Col. Hunter and Capt. Gersham whom I had known very well while he was with the Kachin Levies. He said he had six Kachins with him who were supposed to be guides, but who were strangers to this part of the country themselves.

When the men found out I was a Catholic priest, quite a number were very anxious for me to go to their bivouac area to hear confessions. They had then no Catholic chaplain with them. Capt. Curl and Lt. Pamplin had a long discussion with Gen. Merrill on the trail and the military situation in the area.

I spent all that evening and most of the night hearing the confessions of the men of Col. McGee's "B" Battalion. One man came to be baptized. His two buddies had taught him all the necessary doctrine and he was very keen to be received into the Church. I baptized him on the banks of the Tannai Hka at midnight. I was very glad to have been able to help these men because the battalion was later surrounded by Japanese and besieged in a Kachin village for 13 days. Many of the boys who came to me that night lie buried there.)

On the 16th of March, the Second and Third Battalions crossed 14 miles of rough muddy trail to Weilangyang. The Kachins

warned the Americans that the Japanese were now near, so patrols were sent out along all trails in the vicinity, and blocks and ambushes were established to the northwest and southward. (That warning was not true as there was no immediate danger. We had radio teams covering all trails and we would have at least two days notice of Jap advance from any direction. Trouble was that when I did report danger, I wasn't believed and many American lives were lost needlessly.) To help clear an air-dropping field, the Marauders borrowed some elephants from Capt. Curl who had previously "borrowed" them from the Japanese. As the Japanese had in turn "borrowed" them from the Kachins, the cycle of ownership was now fairly complete.

(March 16th — Capt. Curl said that Gen. Merrill wanted me to go along with him to arrange guides and find out about trails and collect other information for him. Quite a large number of Kachins in the employment of the Knothead group were handed over to Gen. Merrill as guides. These men knew all the trails of the area in which the Galahad forces were to operate. Capt. Curl came with us but was recalled to base on March 22nd. I spent a lot of time with Gen. Merrill. I brought along some very intelligent Kachins who gave him all the necessary data on the trails.)

A large food-drop was picked up on this field, and during the day of March 18th the Americans rested, washed their clothes and did a little fishing and swimming. Capt. James W. Parker, the unit dental officer, came in by plane and started work on all those whose teeth needed attention. With him he brought dispatches which gave General Merrill last-minute reports on enemy activity and an account of what was happening to the First Battalion, then moving toward Shaduzup. (Father Barrett came in by small plane too. It was here I first met him. He wouldn't believe I was a priest. He wanted to know what I was doing with a carbine and a 45. When I met him at Nhpum on March 27th, he had a carbine. Later he asked me to get him a 45 from OSS. Lt. Pamplin gave him his . . .)

Just at dusk on March 18th, a liaison plane dropped a message from General Stilwell instructing the Second and Third Battalions to "block approaches down the Tanai from the south." (The only information from this area was OSS. We had small intelligence groups with radio transmitting reports twice daily. Any order Stilwell sent was based on our reports.) Merrill decided to do this by moving to the general line, Kaulun Gamupaw Ga, there to await further orders.

At 1300 hours on March 19th the Second Battalion, together with the command group, moved out to Janpan, leaving the Third Battalion to follow shortly. Armed with everything from flintlocks to captured Japanese weapons, Capt. Curl and his Kachin guerillas (approximately 300 strong) went along with the Second Battalion. (The Kachins were armed with Tommy guns, Springfields, carbines and British Bren guns. They had old hand grenades. None of our combat Kachins carried flintlocks and none used Jap weapons. As soon as the Kachins captured Jap equipment it was sent back to Base.)

On the following day, March 20th, at 1030 hours, General Merrill held a staff meeting following receipt of radio orders from General Stilwell and gave the following instructions: "The enemy is estimated to have 300 men at Shaduzup, 500 to 600 at Jambu Bum, and about 200 south and west of Kamaing.

"Tasu Bu, halfway between Tara and Lonkin, was captured on the 18th. First Battalion is now in the vicinity of Jaiwa Ga, (only six miles from where Merrill himself was) and moving southwest to put in a road block below Shaduzup, followed by the Chinese 113th Infantry and the 6th Pack Artillery Battery. It had contact with the enemy at 1200 hours yesterday one mile west of Tanga Ga. The enemy appears to be using delaying tactics.

"The Second Battalion and the Khaki CT of the Third Battalion under command of Col. Charles N. Hunter will move south on the Warong trail, reconnoiter the trails south toward Kamaing and move rapidly to seize and hold a block on the main road between Warazup and Malakawng in the general vicinity of Inkangahtawng.

"A supply drop has been arranged at Auche for the late afternoon of the 22nd of March.

"Orange CT will remain in the vicinity of Janpan, prepared to move on short notice. Two reinforced platoons will be kept ready to polish off any Japs filtering into this area. Extensive patrolling of the trails to the north, south and west will be maintained. (There were no Japs in the immediate vicinity. We had controlled this area for months.)

"One radio team from the Third Battalion will report to the command group with SCR 284 radio to work OSS information net. Capt. Curl's guerillas will also aid in the patrolling of this area and will furnish guides to go with Col. Hunter's force. (Curl had left for Base. I was the only OSS man with Merrill then.)

"Communications will be maintained by radio, runner and liaison plane with this command post which will be at Janpan temporarily."

These orders placed Col. Charles N. Hunter, second in command of the Galahad unit, in charge of a special task force composed of the entire Second Battalion plus Maj. Briggs' Kakhi CT from the Third Battalion.

The Marauders spent the night in Janpan. The next day, March 21st, an air-drop was taken. Also, a clinic was held for the Kachins, which earned for the American medical officers the gratitude and good will of the natives. In the afternoon, Col. Hunter's special force headed south, arriving the next day, March 22nd, at Auche where they were informed of the detailed plan. Their route took them through Nhpum Ga — which was soon to be the scene of the heaviest engagement in the campaign. Nhpum Ga was a small village of four families. The village was on a hill top with but one water hole.

The detailed plan directed Hunter to move rapidly to block the Kamaing Road in the vicinity of Inkangahtawng. Third Battalion (less Khaki CT) consisting of Bat-

(Continued on page 8)

FATHER STUART . . .

(Continued from page 7)

talion Headquarters and Lew's Orange CT (still at Janpan) would support Hunter's force for this operation, and its mission would be to block the trail below Auche leading to Warong and the trails south of Manpin in order to prevent Japanese forces moving from the Kamaing area against the rear of Hunter's force.

An OSS man brought in information that the Japanese were patrolling trails in the neighborhood at Auche at irregular intervals, but as yet they had placed no blocks. Activity to the west, he also reported, had increased considerably. (I got the news from Kachins.)

General Merrill, back at his Janpan headquarters, was awakened that night by the arrival of a radio message from General Stilwell saying: "Japs withdrawing down the road. Jambum fell today. Come fast now." (Jambu Bum fell on 28th March. This was 22nd of March. I think Merrill misread the map coordinates or else . . .).

As the Marauders were already moving toward Ingankahtawng to cut the main road at that point, the operation to which General Stilwell referred had been put in motion, and there was nothing further to be done, Merrill went back to sleep.

(March 22nd — B and C Battalions of Gen. Merrill's force left Janpan with Kachin guides to put in a road block at Ingankahtawng. Regimental Headquarters was left with no American combat troops and our only protection was about 30 Kachins in my charge. I got a message asking me to report back to our headquarters at Nawbum. Gen. Merrill asked me to remain with him. I did. (I had 30 Kachins actually with me then. But we had about 300 scattered in this area doing patrol duty. Later at the battle of Napum these rallied round to help out).

On March 23rd, Merrill's command group displaced to Mupaw Ga, and Col. Hunter's force pressed rapidly forward.

His plan was this: The Second Battalion would throw up a road block at Ingankahtawng, patrols would be sent north to contact troops from the 113th Chinese Regiment which should be working down from Shaduzup (The Chinese actually reached Ingankahtawng early in June long after the fall of the Myitkyina air strip) also, the force would cut the road again south of Ingankahtawng toward Kamaing. The Khaki CT would be held in reserve for any mission which might be demanded of it later. (This never happened. The second party to the arrangement (the Japs) proved unwilling.)

This whole operation was expected to tie in with the thrust which the First Battalion was then making near Shaduzup. It was planned that the two simultaneous attacks on the Japanese-held road would be mutually supporting and divide the enemy's attention. Word that Osborne's First Battalion was delayed and would be unable to coordinate its activities came too late to modify the overall plan. Consequently, the Japanese were able to concentrate much more of their strength against McGee's Second Battalion than was anticipated.

(March 24th — Regimental Headquarters moved into Napum after a night march. I led the way with Kachins. Gen. Merrill set up his headquarters at Napum temporarily. He intended moving south to Warong. Karing, a "101" trained Kachin agent, sent a message in the late evening stating that Japs were pushing up from Kamaing toward Warong. One combat team, 450 men, of Americans were covering trails from Warong to Kamaing and to the Mogaung Valley motor road. Ahead of them were small Kachin patrols. One battalion plus one combat team of Americans had a road block at Ingankahtawng. Their only way out was through Warong. It was imperative to hold this village till the main body of Americans got through or they faced annihilation. The Americans defending Warong held out till all the others arrived but were helped immensely by Ka-

chins who operated further afield in the enemy's rear and delayed the enemy considerably.)

On March 25th (?) (dates seem to be mixed) patrols from the Second Battalion clashed with Japanese near Ingankahtawng. Reconnaissance scouts reported a company of enemy dug in near the village apparently alerted and being reinforced. The Second Battalion pushed forward as far as it could and in the face of increasing opposition dug in about a quarter of a mile north of Ingankahtawng and 300 yards east of the Kamaing Road. Khaki CT now took up a position on the east bank of the Mogaung Hka (river) where it could protect the rear, patrol eastward, and assist the battalion with mortar fire.

Shortly after daylight on March 26th (?) McGee sent two reinforced platoons across the Mogaung Hka to envelop the village. These platoons struck heavily fortified positions too strong for them to handle, and McGee ordered them to withdraw before they became inextricably involved.

(Continued in next issue)

WEATHER REPORT

Grand Canyon. Al Fedder says it's cold up there, that when he starts to drive off to work in the morning, his car has to idle a fourth of a mile before the wheels begin to turn.



MERRILL'S MARAUDERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

RAYMOND V. LYONS
11244 N. 33rd St.
Phoenix, AZ 85028

Address correction requested

NON-PROFIT ORG.
U.S. Postage
PAID
Scottsdale, AZ.
Permit No. 324