Legitimacy, Counterinsurgency, and Order 66/2523[1]

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Abstract

The "political offensive" against Communist insurgency codified in Prime Ministerial Order 66/2523 (1980) shaped the institutions and practices that maintained relative peace in the southernmost provinces of Thailand during the 1980s and 1990s. This article traces the intellectual roots of Thai counterinsurgency and its relationship to political legitimacy, focusing on writings by General Han Linanon, one of Order 66/2523's reputed authors. Classical counterinsurgency theory posits political legitimacy as the outcome of security, development and sound administration. The contemporary insurgency indicates a need to reassess assumptions of classical counterinsurgency which developed in response to the challenges of modernization. This article suggests that the state's failure to maintain sufficient legitimacy in southernmost Thailand in order to prevent a reinvigorated insurgency results from problems inherent in the "hearts-and-minds" conception of counterinsurgency, which posits legitimacy as the effect of, rather than precondition for, effective administration, security, and development. In particular, the conflation of "good governance" with popular participation, and democracy with popular sovereignty, has implications for security in southern Thailand and political stability in the broader Thai polity.

Introduction

Whenever violence roils the Malay-Muslim majority areas of southernmost Thailand, pundits and former officials call for the government to revive Prime Ministerial Order 66/2523, the "Policy on the Struggle to Defeat the Communists," revered by some as the "bible" of Thai counterinsurgency.[3] Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon issued Order 66/2523 on 23 April 1980, just seven weeks after taking office. The Order, known as 66/23, codified an approach called "politics leads military" (*karnmuang nam karntahan*).[4] It advocated a "political offensive" that reflected "classical" counterinsurgency doctrine embracing security, development, and good governance.[5] According to this conception of counterinsurgency (or COIN), security, development and sound administration together produce legitimacy, obviating the insurrectionary impulse.

As commander of the Second Army Region (Northeast) in the mid-1970s, Prem and his chief of staff, Major General Han Linanon, employed this political approach against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Later, Han played a key role in drafting 66/23, which was presented to the public not only as a counterinsurgency strategy, but also as a blueprint for solving the nation's problems by establishing democracy. From 1981 to 1983, as commander of the southern Fourth Army Region, General Han implemented 66/23 under the rubric of *Tai Rom Yen* ("South in the Cool Shade" or "Tranquil South"), earning a reputation as an effective counterinsurgent leader.

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[3] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987) 20.

[4] Marc Askew states that the correct translation of *karnmuang nam karntahan* is: "politically-orientated operations leading conventional military action." (Marc Askew, "The Democrats and the Southern Malaise," *The Bangkok Post*, 13 September 2009.) This translation expresses the phrase's operational meaning, but minimizes the extent to which it was employed as a slogan justifying an enhanced political role for the military that had little to do with military operations. The concept may be traced as far back as Prime Ministerial Order 110/2512 in 1969.

[5] A subsequent Prime Ministerial Order, No. 65/2525 (1982), expanded on the concept of "political offensive" as the means to defeat Communism.

New rounds of violence inevitably prompt calls for 66/23 and *Tai Rom Yen* to be dusted off and reapplied.[6]

Duncan McCargo attributes the contemporary insurgency in southernmost Thailand to a political-legitimacy deficit. Interestingly, he traces the roots of this deficit to institutions and practices established in accord with 66/23's political offensive. According to McCargo, a "social compact" between Bangkok and Malay-Muslim elites, engineered by Prem and the Army in the early 1980s, aimed to secure the loyalty of the borderlands populace by co-opting Malay-Muslim community and religious leaders. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), established in 1981 to coordinate and monitor the civilian bureaucracy in the five southernmost provinces, managed this social compact. Although this arrangement was "broadly effective in muting the violence for around two decades," it ultimately failed to generate sufficient legitimacy to preclude a reinvigorated insurgency in the early years of this decade.[7]

The eventual exhaustion of the "political offensive" in the context of southernmost Thailand suggests a need to reconsider the relationship between legitimacy, on the one hand, and security, development, and governance, on the other. This article examines the intellectual roots of the social compact by exploring the evolution of Thai counterinsurgency doctrine and the relationship between legitimacy and counterinsurgency. This article suggests that the state's failure to maintain legitimacy sufficient to prevent a reinvigorated insurgency in southernmost Thailand results from

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[6] In January 1998, amid a spike in Malay-Muslim separatist attacks in southernmost Thailand, Han wrote a letter to the Fourth Army Region commander, Lieutenant Preecha Suwannasri, calling on him to follow the principles of *Tai Rom Yen*. (Han Linanon [หาญ ลีนานนท์], "Bring Back Tai Rom Yen to Beat the Separatist Bandits [ฟื้น ใต้ร่มเย็นสยบขจก]," *Daily News [เดลินิวส์]* 19 January 2541 [1998].) See also "New Version of 66/23 Needed to Douse Southern Fire [66/23 ดับไฟใต้ต้องทำเวอร์ชั่นใหม่]," *Matichon [มติชน]* 6 April 2547 [2004] and "Restore Policy 66/23, the Strategy to Douse the Southern Fire [ฟื้นนโยบาย 66-23 ยุทธศาสตร์ดับไฟใต้]," *Matichon [มติชน]* 3 April 2547 [2004].

[7] Duncan McCargo, *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) 85.

problems inherent in the "hearts-and-minds" counterinsurgency and from the state's conflation of "good governance" with popular participation.

The Counterinsurgency Triad: Security, Development and Good Governance

Legitimacy is the fundamental issue in counterinsurgency.[8] For Bard O'Neill:

> Legitimacy and illegitimacy refer to whether or not existing aspects of politics are considered moral or immoral (or, to simplify, right or wrong) by the population or selected elements therein. For our purposes politics is defined as the process of making and executing binding decisions for a society ... [9]

McCargo's discussion of legitimacy draws on Muthiah Alagappa, who posits four elements of the concept: "shared norms and values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power, proper and effective use of power, and consent of the governed." [10] In order for legitimacy to operate, interaction between rulers and ruled must produce consensus on values, rights, obligations and the meaning of 'shared.' This process is dynamic, continuous, and generates degrees of legitimacy.[11] For Riggs, legitimacy can only be assured by

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[8] Max G. Manwaring, "Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response," (Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001) 19; David Howell, Petraeus, James F. Amos, United States. Dept. of the Army and United States Marine Corps., *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 2006), <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>: 21.

[9] Bard E. O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," *Insurgency in the Modern World*, eds. Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980) 1.

[10] Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995) 15.

[11] Muthiah 14.

balancing bureaucratic and executive authority with that of a "constitutive system." Simply put, a constitutive system consists of a popularly elected assembly that has the capacity to exercise, "an effective check on the arbitrary exercise of power by those who rule ...." [12] Legitimacy demands constraints on the exercise of power.

If legitimacy is a political construct, then counterinsurgency is a political endeavor. According to counterinsurgency theorist David Galula, "political action remains foremost throughout the war. ... *politics becomes an active instrument of operation.*" [13] Reflecting the strategy of a Maoist people's war that it was designed to counter, classical counterinsurgency takes the population, rather than enemy formations, as the primary objective. The need for popular support, according to Galula, is counterinsurgency's "first law." [14]

Consent demands that a government meet the needs of the people, commonly conceived in terms of security, material welfare and responsive administration. In counterinsurgency, these three dimensions must be harmonized by the overarching imperative of "unity of effort." [15] *Security* includes counter-guerrilla operations and a static defense of the population. *Development* concerns all efforts to raise the population's material welfare. *Governance* is a more problematic notion. At a minimum, it entails sufficient administrative capacity to pursue security and development. More expansive conceptions of the politico-administrative dimension include actions to mobilize the population and establish political processes and

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[12] Fred W. Riggs, "Administration and a Changing World Environment," *Public Administration Review* 28.4 (1968): 355.

[13] David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964) 9.

[14] Galula 74-75.

[15] D. Michael Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency," *Political Science Quarterly* 103.1 (1988): 62-64.

institutions. This three-sided conception of counterinsurgency is often called "hearts and minds" because it seeks popular support.[16]

Hearts-and-minds counterinsurgency has intellectual roots in post-World War II social-science theories of modernization, which served as the rationale for U.S. assistance to Thailand and other "Third World" countries in the 1960s.[17] Modernization theory boiled down to a conviction that technological and economic changes forced non-Western societies into an abrupt transition from tradition to modernity, characterized chiefly by industrialization, capitalism and Western-style representative political systems. The transition was perilous, involving the erosion of consensus about the legitimacy of authority, introduction of new social forces into the political process, and expanding demands on government. These changes produced instability and anxieties that the "new states" were ill equipped to manage. In order to mitigate the deleterious effects of modernization, governments needed to achieve "national integration," i.e., assimilation of "primordial" religious and ethnic identities into a national identity, alignment of elite and mass values, extension of government administration over peripheral territory, and development of institutions to foster cooperation throughout society.[18] Failure to bridge the gaps between state and society would leave the populations

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[16] This term is attributed to General Sir Gerald Templer, Director of Operations and High Commissioner in Malaya during the Emergency: "The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people." Cited in Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966) 3.

[17] These ideas were formulated most notably by a cohort of social scientists associated with the Committee on Comparative Politics established by the Social Science Research Council in late 1953. Among the early members of the Committee on Comparative Politics were Asianists George McT. Kahin, Guy Pauker, and Lucien Pye. (Mark T. Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945-1975," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34.3 (2003).)

[18] Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 358 (1965). See also Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

of transitional societies vulnerable to communist blandishments. This broad understanding of modernization underpinned the Kennedy Administration's response to "wars of national liberation."

The track record of "hearts-and-minds" counterinsurgency is mixed. Its failures may not always be a function of faulty execution. Rather, as Shafer argues, the classical counterinsurgency formula:

> ... presupposes the very issues at question in a country threatened by insurgency: that government and populace share goals that will be advanced by greater government capabilities at the grassroots level. Yet elites' interests and those of the population may be very different.[19]

In fact, the imperatives of the counterinsurgency triad have the potential to cut both ways in the legitimacy stakes, intensifying destabilizing aspects of modernization such as social mobility, rising expectations, and greater interaction between state and populace.

This is perhaps most evident with regard to security; efforts to isolate insurgents entail, at the least, inconvenience for the population, and more often curtailment of civil liberties. Insurgent activities aim to provoke indiscriminate state repression that functions to discredit the government. Economic development, provision of infrastructure, and increased material welfare are often seen as categorical goods, but may complicate government efforts to establish legitimacy. Economic change introduces social dislocation and disruption of traditional values, which may be conducive to insurgent challenges. Sound administration is likewise not always a straightforward means to legitimacy. The extension of administrative capabilities may carry unintended consequences for a counterinsurgent government, undermining local authority and established patterns of decision-making. Moreover, governments often lack the requisite sensitivity and even-handedness; inefficiency and abuse of power lead to resentment among local communities and further alienation from the central government.

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[19] Shafer 70.

The basic error may be in conceiving of security, development, and good governance as a means to, rather than effects of, legitimacy. Riggs explains:

> [M]odern public administration depends for its success on the willingness of citizens to do what government commands, as well as on the capacity and readiness of bureaucrats to shape and transmit these commands. ... The effectiveness of public administration, in a word, varies directly with the degree of legitimacy of government.[20]

Legitimacy, according to this interpretation, is a precondition–not a product–of good governance. Riggs' delineation of the relationship between administration and legitimacy turns the classical COIN formula inside out and may help to explain cases where classical counterinsurgency fails.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Thailand: Security and Development

Thailand in the 1950s exemplified few of the strains characteristic of transitional societies. Never colonized, Thailand emerged from the Second World War without having developed a broad-based nationalist movement. However, according to Riggs' seminal 1966 case study of modernization, the expansion of the Thai bureaucracy in the early twentieth century, and its ability to exert control at the local level, produced a "transitional" situation. Outside the bureaucracy, there existed no "countervailing matrix of public action, whereby the interests of the people might have been imposed upon the government in a framework of law and accountability." [21] In what Riggs called a "bureaucratic polity," competition for status and power took place almost entirely within the bureaucratic arena.[22]

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[20] Riggs, "Administration and a Changing World Environment" 353-54.

[21] Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966) 196.

[22] Riggs, *Thailand* 197. For critiques of misuses of the bureaucratic polity framework, see Kevin Hewison, "Introduction: Power Oppostions and Democratisation,"

Following the 1932 demise of the absolute monarchy, extra-bureaucratic forces exercised little influence on the distribution of power. The legislature and political parties provided a veneer of legitimacy to military rule while offering only modest opposition. To maintain their authority, leaders distributed the "spoils of office" to gain support from key factions, fostering corruption and official tolerance of illegal activity.[23] The rural masses, often portrayed as contented and politically apathetic, played no political role.[24]

The Army dominated politics from 1932 through the early 1980s. Sarit Thanarat set the pattern in 1958 by abrogating the constitution, disbanding the National Assembly, and imposing martial law. His style of rule combined economic development, populism, official corruption, centralized authority, and suppression of dissent. Following Sarit's death in 1963, power passed to his protégés, Generals (later Field Marshals) Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphat Charusathien, who occupied the most senior executive positions until ousted in popular protests in 1973. The duo emulated Sarit's authoritarianism, but, faced with growing demands for greater democracy, paid lip service to representative government. By the mid-1970s, Thailand faced all of the strains of "transition".

Thai counterinsurgency doctrine developed in response to the challenge presented by the Communist Party of Thailand, which initiated guerrilla war in the Northeast in August 1965. Elite conceptions of the CPT threat changed over time. Many in Thailand's security establishment saw communism as fundamentally un-Thai, an alien import taken up only by ethnic minorities. For this reason, the threat was remote. Another view of the threat reflected that of Bangkok's U.S. benefactors, which perceived the appeal of the CPT

Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison, (London; New York: Routledge, 1997) and James Ockey, "State, Bureaucracy and Polity in Modern Thai Politics," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 34.2 (2004).

[23] Edgar L. Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5.1 (1960): 70.

[24] Donald Hindley, "Thailand: The Politics of Passivity," *Pacific Affairs* 41.3 (1968); Stephen B. Young, "The Northeastern Thai Village: A Non-Participatory Democracy," *Asian Survey* 8.11 (1968).

as rooted in social and economic grievances.[25]   This conception became more prevalent following political upheavals in the mid-1970s.

Counterinsurgency practice reflected this bifurcated view of the CPT threat, as well as a gap between policy and implementation. From the outset, some officials recognized that the threat was not primarily military and that the government needed the support of the population to prevail. The government employed a mix of "active and passive," or direct and indirect, measures, corresponding to suppression and development; the challenge was to determine and implement the proper mix.[26] In order to execute these measures, the government sought "unity of effort" through special coordinating organizations.   A Communist Suppression Center (CSC) was established in December 1965 to plan and conduct operations. (In 1969, the CSC became the Communist Suppression Operations Center [CSOC] and in 1974 the Internal Security Operations Center [ISOC]).
[27] General Saiyud Kerdphol, first director of the CSOC, formulated Thailand's counterinsurgency approach, known as the Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) concept. The aim was to coordinate development measures with counter-guerrilla operations and enforcement of law and order by unifying relevant agencies and officials under a single command.

According to Saiyud, "CSOC came to understand very quickly … that our goal should be not only to eliminate the insurgents but also to win over the people to the government. Winning the people, in

[25] Sanchai Buntrigswat, *Thailand: The Dual Threats to Stability in a Study of Communist Insurgency and Problems of Political Development* (Bangkok: Borpit Co., 1979) 425; Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977) 182.

[26] Chai-anan Samudavanija, Kusuma Sanitwong Na Ayutthaya and Suchit Bunbongkarn, *From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive* (Bangkok, Thailand: Institute of Security and International Studies, 1990) 57; Kanok Wongtrangan, "Communist Revolutionary Process: A Study of the Communist Party of Thailand," Ph.D. Diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1982: 93; George K. Tanham, *Trial in Thailand* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974) 72, 89.

[27] Hereafter, "CSOC" signifies both the CSC and the CSOC.

fact, is the key to success." [28] Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the practice of Thai counterinsurgency was reactive, intermittent, disproportionate, and uncoordinated. Why was the Thai government not able to follow through on the CPM approach? The consensus among scholars is that authoritarianism inhibited rational decision making and coordination.[29] Under military dictatorship, the imperative of maintaining stability by distributing power among factions militated against efficient organization, decisive action, and interagency cooperation.[30]

Even as the Army pursued a primarily suppressive approach, Saiyud and like-minded officers, advised by high-ranking CPT defectors Prasert Sapsunthorn and Phin Bua-on, pressed for a political strategy.[31] On 30 May 1969, the Prime Minister's Office issued Order 110/2512, which called on officials to "persuade people from all social strata to trust and have faith in the authorities' work and the government's administration."   Moreover, "In prevention and suppression, political and psychological measures are preferred over military and legal measures. The latter are to be used only when necessary." [32] Order 110/2512 carried the force of a prime ministerial directive, but provided only general guidance to officials. The

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[28] Saiyud Kerdphol, *The Struggle for Thailand: Counter-Insurgency 1965-1985* (Bangkok: S. Research Center Co., 1986) 42.

[29] Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Organizing Counter-Insurgency: The Thai Experience," *South-East Asian Spectrum* 2.2 (1974): 48; Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Government Responses to Armed Communist and Separatist Movements," *Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia*, ed. Chandran Jeshurun, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985) 267.

[30] Blaufarb 200-201. The prime example is the late-1967 transfer from the CSOC to the Army of the responsibility for counterinsurgency operations. Increasing the CSOC requests for Army logistical support and personnel, and the growing paramilitary capabilities of special police units and the Border Patrol Police, alarmed some factions within the Army. (Donald M. Weller, *Counterinsurgency in Thailand: Volume IV: Appendixes: The Insurgent Threat and the RTG Counterinsurgency Effort* (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1968) 78-79.)

[31] Surachart Bamrungsuk, "From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and Politics in Thailand, 1973-1992," Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1999: 93.

[32] Cited in Kanok 91.

substance of the Order was little appreciated by many officials and officers in the field.[33]

Amid the political upheavals of the mid-1970s, reformist Army officers began to formulate ideas about the Army's future political role. In the wake of the 14 October 1973 student uprising that ousted Thanom and Praphat, officers of Chulachomklao Military Academy's Class 7,[34] commonly called the Young Turks, advanced a populist analysis of society, decrying the self-interest of senior officers, parliamentarians and businessmen. The Young Turks recognized poverty, corruption, and government inefficiency as causes of insurgency.[35] Former CPT official Prasert influenced the thinking of another group, the Democratic Soldiers. Mostly staff officers with experience in the ISOC, the Democratic Soldiers maintained that only democracy could avert a CPT victory, but offered only vague indications of what "democracy" meant in practice.[36] The two groups were distinct, but both were linked to General Prem.

From 1973 to 1976, Prem learned first-hand about the causes of insurgency in the Northeast as deputy commander, and later commander, of the Second Army Region. By Prem's account, the experience led him to reassess his understanding of the insurgency:

> Once we succeeded in getting the villagers to talk to us, we learned of extortions, of husbands and sons being summarily "put away" at the slightest suspicion or of daughters being

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[33] Han Pongsithanon [หาญ พงศ์สิฏานน์], "Insurgency Problems in Local Areas [ปัญหาการก่อการร้ายในส่วนภูมิภาค]," *Insurgency Problems in Local Areas and Ethnic Minorities [ปัญหาการก่อการร้ายในส่วนภูมิภาคและชนกลุ่มน้อย]*, Vol. 1, (Bangkok: Sukhothai University Press, 1985) 364; Surachart, "From Dominance to Power Sharing" 93.

[34] The seventh class to have graduated under the Academy's West Point-style curriculum in 1960.

[35] Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 118.

[36] Chai-anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Thailand," *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*, eds. Ahmad Zakaria bin Haji and Harold A. Crouch (Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 102; Thomas A. Marks, "Thailand: Anatomy of a Counterinsurgency Victory," *Military Review* 87.1 (2007): 46; Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 120.

abducted to satisfy the casual needs of someone or another. In short, officialdom was its own enemy, turning ordinary villagers into communist sympathizers determined to avenge the wrongs perpetrated.[37]

Under Prem's command, the Second Army embraced Order 110/2512, conceiving of a people's war as a problem arising from poverty, the nature of villagers' interactions with officials, and the impact of indiscriminate security operations.[38]

Kanok attributes the Second Army's approach to Prem's chief of staff, Major General Han Linanon, who understood that, "in order to solve the insurgency problem, it is necessary to work with the people and end the misdeeds of the officials." [39] The approach had three goals: defeat the CPT in the villages; separate villagers from the CPT; and isolate the guerrillas by securing targeted villages, using the strategy of "village surrounds the jungle." The Self-defense and Development Volunteers, organized by locally elected village headmen, and an amnesty for CPT guerrillas were key mechanisms of the Second Army approach.[40]

Order 66/2523: COIN as Ideology

As Prem rose to the highest Army posts and finally to the premiership in 1980, he promoted the Second Army approach, culminating with 66/23. Although no one is credited with authoring 66/23, Nisit suggests that Lt. General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh drafted the military aspects of Order 66/23 and Han the political aspects.[41] Order 66/23's declared objective was to, "put an end in the shortest

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[37] Prem Tinsulanon, *Thai Experience in Combating Insurgency 1995*, <http://www.generalprem.com/ Speech4.html.>

[38] Nisit Chansomvong [นิสิต จันทร์สมวงศ์], "The Counter Insurgency Strategy of the Royal Thai Army: A Case Study of the 'Tai Rom Yen' Policy of the Fourth Army Region [บทบาทของกองทัพบกไทยในการต่อสู้เพื่อ เอาชนะคอมมิวนิสต์ตามนโยบายใต้ร่มเย็นของ กองทัพภาคที่ 4]," Ph.D. Diss., Chulalongkorn University 2530 [1987] 238.

[39] Kanok 132.

[40] Nisit 243-48; Sanchai 432.

[41] Nisit 285.

possible time to the communist revolutionary war." The policy called for a "political offensive" against communist united-front organizations to "eliminate the revolutionary situation," defined as "one in which the Government is isolated from the people and weakened and its leadership over democratic movements ... is usurped." The Order's operational guidelines prioritized elimination of social injustice and exploitation, and called for "a rule of conduct" to "promote harmony of interests among people of different classes and sacrifice of class interests for the common good." The Order identified "corruption and malfeasance in the bureaucracy" as a chief problem and stipulated that political and military operations be based on understanding of "prevailing conditions"; that communist defectors and prisoners be treated as fellow countrymen and assisted with reintegration into society; and that "all existing democratic movements must be promoted." [42]

On the surface, 66/23 is an innocuous document. In terms of counterinsurgency operations, it merely restated principles that had been elucidated in Order 110/2512.[43] Order 66/23 differed from earlier policies in that it applied to all government agencies and assigned the ISOC responsibility for implementation. More importantly, 66/23 included a critique of state and society, acknowledging class conflicts and injustices arising from defects in governance.[44] Finally, it identified democracy as the means to defeat communism.[45]

Order 66/23's conception of democracy was ambiguous. Section 4.4 of the Order reads:

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[42] Cited in Chai-anan, Kusuma, and Suchit 195-203.

[43] Nisit 251-52; Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 69.

[44] Chalermkiat Phiu-nual [เฉลิมเกียรติ ผิวนวล], *Political Thought of the Thai Military 1976-1992* [ความคิดทางการเมืองของทหารไทย *2519-2535*] (กรุงเทพฯ ผู้จัดการ, 2535 [1992]) 90 .

[45] Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 69.

> The ability of all professions to govern themselves and the
> opportunity for their political participation must be promoted.
> Ways and means must be laid out to ascertain the people's
> problems and the latter's wishes must be considered the
> foremost factor in planning operational guidelines to fulfill
> those wishes.[46]

Here democracy appears as a government-provided public good, like roads and schools. The meaning of "politics" in the "political offensive" was also unclear. One analyst noted that, "politics here does not have its political-science meaning of [a system for] distributing social values among the people," but rather psychological operations, security measures, and efforts to assist the population.[47] Han conceded that 66/23 lacked a clear explanation of political measures.[48]

If the meaning of "democracy" in 66/23 was ambiguous, the meaning of "political participation" was clearer. In practice, participation meant membership in mass organizations controlled by the Army or other elements of the bureaucracy. The Army and the ISOC organized broad segments of the population numbering in the millions through the Thai National Defense Volunteers, Self-Defense and Development Volunteers, Military Reservists for National Security, and the Village Scouts. Although these organizations predated 66/23, they were strengthened as the Army and the ISOC sought to fulfill new social and economic development roles.[49] These organizations established lines of patronage running from the highest institutions to the most remote villages. Order 66/23 allowed the Army to develop, for the first time, a network of support among the rural population.[50]

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[46] Cited in Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 199.

[47] Nisit 229.

[48] Han Linanon [หาญ ลีนานนท์], *General Han Speaks* [แม่ทัพหาญพูด] (กรุงเทพฯ: เกษม การพิมพ์, 2526 [1983]) 231-32.

[49] Chai-anan, Kusuma and Suchit 79.

[50] Suchit 84-85.

The political analysis in 66/23 owed a great deal to the discourse promoted by the Democratic Soldiers.[51] The ambiguity of "democracy" in Order 66/23 is consistent with "Study document for program 6601," a 14-chapter exegesis of the Order reputedly written by the Democratic Soldiers' guru, Prasert, and circulated within the ISOC in the early 1980s. Chapter 13 explains that democracy, above all else, is popular sovereignty, the realization of the "general will" in the form of a social contract. The general will is not the sum of the individual wills, but the will of the people in relation to the collective interest.[52] It is not clear from the document how the general will is best determined. Direct democracy is impractical, so popular sovereignty is expressed through representatives. The government established by the 1932 coup group, for example, with its appointed prime minister and appointed assembly, was democratic, "because that government represented the masses and exercised sovereignty in place of the Thai masses." [53]

Order 66/23 was not solely a counterinsurgency policy. The Order reflected high-level, bureaucratic efforts to fashion a national ideology to ameliorate social and economic divisions exposed by insurgency and popular demands for greater democracy. In 1976, the National Security Council circulated a document that called for broadening the national ideology to include politics, economics and social psychology. As Connors recounts, the document affirmed that in the wake of the recent upheavals:

> [T]he existing ideology (nation, religion, king) is too distant
> from people (*hangklai tua koen pai*) and no longer 'stimulates'
> (*raojai*) the people. Fearing the consequences of rapid social
> change and the subsequent instability, the NSC foresaw

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[51] Chai-anan and Suchit 104.

[52] "Study Document for Program 6601 [เอกสารประกอบการศึกษา โครงการ 6601]," *Dissecting Military Policies 66/2523, 65/2525, 6601* [ชำแหละนโยบายกองทัพ *66/2523, 65/2525, 6601*] (กรุงเทพฯ: บริษัท วงการจำกัด n.d.) 152; Michael Kelly Connors, *Democracy and National Identity in Thailand* (New York London: Routledge Curzon, 2003) 108.

[53] "Study Document for Program 6601" 154.

> continuing threats to national security as long as the people
> were 'confused, anxious, and without a common standpoint.'[54]

Order 66/23 represented the acme of the bureaucracy's self-conscious effort to establish a new ideological basis for national integration. High-ranking army officers touted the Order as the solution to the nation's social, economic, and political ills.[55] General Chavalit called 66/23 the "national ideology." [56]

Significantly, practical measures specified in Order 66/23 concern reform of the bureaucracy. Section 4.2 reads, "Social injustice must be eliminated at every level, from local to national levels. Corruption and malfeasance in the bureaucracy must be decisively done away with and the security of the people's life and property provided." Section 4.3 reads in part, "Officials concerned must be just, understand the problems of people of all classes, and recognize that Thais from all walks of life love their country and are ready to make sacrifices in order to uphold the nation, religion, and monarchy as well as the democratic system of government with the King as the head of the state." Order 66/23 blamed shortcomings in the bureaucracy, rather than the regime, for the failure to achieve national integration.

Order 66/23 in the South

When Han took command of the Fourth Army Region in September 1981, the South represented the most complicated set of internal security problems in the Kingdom, including organized crime, the CPT, the Malayan Communist Party, and increasingly assertive Malay-Muslim separatist groups. Counterinsurgency against the CPT

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[54] Connors 137. This characterization of the Thai political and social situation–rapid social change, instability, and unsettled mental states–echoes modernization theory of the 1960s.

[55] Chalermkiat 107.

[56] Yos Santasombat, "Leadership and Security in Modern Thai Politics," *Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience*, eds. Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-anan Samudavanija, (Singapore: Regional Strategic Studies Programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989) 108, note 29.

in the mid-South had been particularly brutal.[57] In the deep South, development programs involved intelligence and psychological operations that antagonized Malay-Muslim villagers and left many distrustful of the government.[58] The deficiency of administration, and administrators, is a recurrent theme in analyses of unrest in the southern border provinces.[59] Bureaucrats regularly offended Muslims by using derogatory language, by failing to demonstrate understanding of Islam, and by maintaining stereotypical views of Muslims as lazy, dirty, and ignorant.[60] Thai government assessments described the failings of government officials as a source of friction that widened the gap between government and people. In 1980, Interior official Uthai Hiranto noted persistent, widespread problems with officials that contributed to separatist thinking among some Malay Muslims and impelled them to join guerrilla movements.[61]

According to Han, the dictatorial system prevailing in Thailand created what he called "war conditions" (เงื่อนไขสงคราม), i.e., conditions that favored the communist insurgency. War conditions arise from three factors: dictatorship, influence, and "dark power." Dictatorship is arbitrary rule by a minority in its own interest. Influence is the abuse of authority for private gain, and results most often from collusion between politicians, officials, and capitalists. "Dark power" describes those who exercise arbitrary authority and influence, as well as their actions. War conditions, "induce innocent villagers, students and intellectuals to go to the jungle and take up arms against the

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[57] Han Pongsithanon 366.

[58] Panomporn Anurugsa, "Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of the Malay Muslim Minority," Ph.D. Diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 1984: 166.

[59] M. Ladd Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims," *Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly* 3.1 (1974): 562.

[60] M. Ladd Thomas, "Cultural Factors and Rural Development: Thai Bureaucrats and Thai Muslim Villagers," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 7.1 (1985).

[61] Uthai Hiranto [หิรัญโต อุทัย], "Role of Local Officials in the Problems of the Three Southern Border Provinces [บทบาทของข้าราชการส่วนภูมิภาคต่อปัญหา 3 จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้]," *Asian Review [เอเชียปริทัศน์]* 2.1 (2523 [1980]): 73-74.

government in people's war." [62] Han identified "dictatorial" groups as politicians and officials who abused their authority for private gain at the expense of ordinary villagers. The "influential" often cooperated with CPT, paying "revolutionary taxes" in exchange for access to natural resources.[63] Those who caused the insurgency, therefore, were not just the guerrillas: "Some might even be our friends, some are high-ranking officials ...." [64]

Han's *Tai Rom Yen* policy and the SBPAC represented the government's approach to solving the security and political problems in the South. On 2 October 1981, just weeks after taking command, Han issued the *Tai Rom Yen* policy as Fourth Army Order 751/2524, announcing to journalists that it was an extension of 66/23.[65] Han asserted that frustration with the bureaucracy was the primary factor causing insurgency in the South.[66] Accordingly, the Order's one-paragraph preamble calls for:

> ... close cooperation between officials, as those who govern, and the people, that is, those who are governed. If this is achieved, it will be possible to solve the problems of terrorism by communist terrorists [the CPT], terrorist bandit movements [separatists], Malaysian communist bandits [the Malayan Communist Party] and various other bandit groups.[67]

The *Tai Rom Yen* Order, like 66/23, is anodyne. It contains four points: 1) secure the lives and property of all the people, regardless of ethnicity or religion; 2) secure the Thai-Malaysian border in order to improve the economy and Thai-Malaysian relations; 3) eradicate pervasive dictatorship, influence and dark power through peaceful means, "so that all the people may have rights, freedom, and equality, politically, economically, and socially under a democratic system with

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[62] Han, *General Han Speaks* 88.

[63] Han, *General Han Speaks* 88-89.

[64] Han, *General Han Speaks* 91-92.

[65] Nisit 287.

[66] Nisit 286.

[67] Han Linanon [หาญ ลีนานนท์], *Political Ideology* [อุดมการณ์ทางการเมือง] (กรุงเทพฯ: สื่อสาร, 2527 [1984]) 227.

the king as the head of state"; 4) and build good relations between officials and the people.[68]

Despite the emphasis in 66/23 on peaceful measures, suppression played an important role in the success of *Tai Rom Yen*. The Fourth Army mounted large-scale offensives against CPT strongholds, conducted military patrols to control banditry, and cracked down on illegal mining and logging operations.[69] Han moved against "dark powers," beginning by disarming some of the government's own militias,[70] and went after corrupt and abusive officials, opening post-office boxes to receive anonymous tips about official misconduct and illegal activity. Special "War-Condition Eradication Units" investigated the complaints.[71] The Army also established new psychological operations units called *Santi Nimit* (Dream of Peace) to explain democratic principles to villagers.[72]

Many local people and the media hailed the *Tai Rom Yen* campaign as a success. Andrew Cornish, who conducted fieldwork in Yala in the mid-1980s, reported that, "Many local Malays recall this period as the one time they had an effective channel of complaint to the administration." [73] Some Malay-Muslim scholars credit the approach embodied by *Tai Rom Yen* and the SBPAC with increasing

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[68] Han, *Political Ideology* 228-29.

[69] According to Tarr, Han may have sanctioned extra-judicial killings of suspected criminals, but by 1985 traffic could move safely through the province around the clock. (Shane P. Tarr, "The Nature of Military Intervention in the Countryside of Surat Thani, Southern Thailand," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 23 (1991) 39.)

[70] Fourth Army Region Order 14/2524 disarmed the Thai National Defense Volunteers in urban areas, beginning in Nakorn Sri Thammarat; the Volunteers often served as muscle for "influential groups." Nisit 292.

[71] Han, *General Han Speaks* 37. In the five months between October 1983 and February 1984, the Fourth Army received 167 complaints about "influential people" and 52 complaints about improper conduct by officials. Nisit 305.

[72] Nisit 302.

[73] Andrew Cornish, *Whose Place Is This?: Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government Officials in Yala* (Bangkok; [Cheney, Wash.]: White Lotus Press, 1997) 22. Tarr noted that villagers in Surat Thani in the mid-1980s discerned a difference between contemporary Army psychological operations and Han's *Tai Rom Yen* initiative, "in that the former didn't identify state officials as the major problem." Tarr 44.

Malay Muslims' confidence in the political system.[74]

Han's Fate and 66/23

The path of Han's career following his command of the Fourth Army parallels the fate of his liberal interpretation of 66/23's democracy agenda. Han's success in the South and his high media profile stirred resentment. Han's chief antagonist was General Arthit Kamlang-ek, an ambitious officer who had positioned himself to succeed Prem as prime minister.[75] Although Arthit had aligned with Prem and become Army chief, his support for 66/23 was tepid and widely regarded as politically expedient.[76] Han, on the other hand was a zealous proponent of 66/23. Han and Arthit clashed over the transfer of allegedly corrupt officials.[77] They crossed swords in January 1983 over proposed constitutional amendments that would

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[74] W.K. Che Man, "Democratization and National Integration: Malay Muslim Community in Southern Thailand," *Intellectual Discourse* 10.2 (2003): 19, Suria Saniwa bin Wan Mahmood, "De-Radicalization of Minority Dissent: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslim Movement in Southern Thailand, 1980-1994," *Sama-Sama: Facets of Ethnic Relations in South East Asia*, ed. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, (Diliman: Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, 1999) 127-29.

[75] Han-Arthit: Where Will It End? [หาญ-อาทิตย์ จุดจบอยู่ที่ไหน]," *Su Anakot* [สู่อนาคต] 13-19 November 2526 [1983]. Arthit's star ascended rapidly after he helped quell the Young Turks' 1 April 1981 coup attempt against Prem's government.

[76] Chalermkiat 117-18.

[77] The conflict between Han and Arthit became public when Arthit overruled Han's transfer of Police General Ataphol Chaemsuwanawong from Satun Province. The governor of Satun had requested the transfer on grounds that implied corruption. Prime Minister Prem approved the transfer, but the ISOC reviewed the case, and General Arthit, as chief of the ISOC, signed a report recommending the transfer be rescinded. "Transfer of Satun Superintendent Casts Shadow on Police Department ย้าย ผู้กำกับสตุลสุริยคราสไนกรมตำรวจ]," *Siam Rath Sapdavicharn* [สยามรัฐสัปดาวิจารณ์] 19 June 2526 [1982]: 6-7; Suchit 32, note 25. Han commented later, "… as 4th Army commander I had a program to remove many bad officials from the 4th Army Region area. Some were removed and others were not. When we looked into why some officials could not be removed, we found that these officials provided 'benefit' to their superiors. So their superiors protected them in order to preserve their interests." Han, *Political Ideology* 142.

have preserved the powers of the military-dominated appointed senate and strengthened the military's position in relation to civilian politicians and political parties. Arthit supported the amendments, citing 66/23 to justify his position and claiming that elections had failed to produce capable, public-spirited representatives.[78] Arthit's faction favored a system of appointed representatives, proportionally selected to represent various occupational groups.[79]

Han, and Saiyud, opposed the amendments.[80] Han wrote:

> ... dictatorial groups are taking advantage of 66/23 and using it in irregular ways. In my view this is clearly deceptive and shows contempt for the people. They want to change the Constitution so that officials become "political officials," claiming that it is part of the effort to expand individual rights and freedoms as indicated in Order 66/23. But they haven't understood that the liberty of all the people, according to the ... principles of full democracy, means liberty for the masses or for the whole nation, not liberty for officials ...[81]

Han assailed elites who suggested that Thailand was not prepared for full democracy, dismissing their most common objections: the people are not ready; politicians cannot be trusted; elections are fraudulent due to vote buying; democracy is disorderly. Professional politicians, Han argued, may be more competent than "political bureaucrats"; India enjoyed democracy even though its literacy rate was well below

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[78] Chalermkiat 112.

[79] Jumbala Prudhisan, *Nation-Building and Democratization in Thailand: A Political History* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, Social Research Institute, 1992) 99. The commander of the Army's First Division, Major General Pichit Kullavanij, appeared on television to state that if the amendments were not considered by parliament, the Army might be compelled to "conduct exercises." The Bangkok-based First Division had traditionally been indispensable to successful *coups d'etats*.

[80] Suchitra Punyaratabandhu-Bhakdi, "Thailand in 1983: Democracy, Thai Style," *Asian Survey* 24.2 (1984): 188.

[81] Han, *Political Ideology* 143-144. In the event, the proposed amendments were defeated, falling ten votes short of the required number. Prem dissolved parliament and called new elections before the interim clauses expired.

that of Thailand.[82] Han insisted that rural people may be uneducated, but their understanding of democracy surpassed that of most city dwellers.[83]

Han also revised his view of the role of the armed forces in promoting democracy. Whereas in 1981 he affirmed that the armed forces were already on the path to "revolutionary" victory,[84] in 1984 he wrote:

> The military cannot build democracy because...... no matter how pure [the military's] intentions, no one will trust them because all the times in the past when the generals intervened..... [the result was] never true democracy.... [T]he military must support the birth of real, full democracy by allowing elected political parties to come in and prove their worth .....[85]

After his celebrated command of the Fourth Army, Han might have anticipated a posting as Deputy Army Commander. Instead, he was assigned a desk job at Supreme Command Headquarters. In 1984, Han retired early from active service.

The same year, the Army declared victory over the CPT, but 66/23 remained in effect. Prime Ministerial Order 47/2529, issued on 24 March 1986, affirmed that the CPT had been defeated, but warned that "war conditions" persisted, imperiling the nation. Order 47/2529 restated Order 66/23 as national policy, and called on government agencies to enforce its provisions. Whatever its immediate political purpose, Order 47/2529 served as an admission that democracy had not been achieved.

Han maintained that 66/23 was the right policy, but it was not implemented properly.[86] The premature end of Han's Army career demonstrates that his interpretation of 66/23 put him at odds with ascendant political forces that envisioned a carefully controlled

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[82] Han, *General Han Speaks* 19.

[83] Han, *General Han Speaks* 19, 81.

[84] Han Linanon [หาญ ลีนานนท์], *Two Ways of Revolution* [ปฏิวัติสองแนวทาง] (กรุงเทพฯ: อาทิตย์, 2524 [1981]) 45-46.

[85] Han, *Political Ideology* 161-62.

[86] Han, *General Han Speaks* 240.

parliament and a more prominent political role for the Army. Yet the fact that Han's political adversaries also invoked 66/23 indicates the Order's ambiguity on the basic issues of democracy and participation. For his part, Han continued to call for greater democracy and more direct political participation. As a senator, in 1990 and again in 2002, Han called for direct elections of governors in the southernmost provinces as a means to resolve persistent security problems.[87] Today, such proposals are taboo.

Conclusion: Legitimacy, administration, and participation

Chai-anan Samudavanij proposed a three-dimensional relationship between state and society in the developing world: security, development, and participation, in some measure, are necessary for state legitimacy.[88]   McCargo described security, development, and participation as "three currencies of legitimacy" that Thai elites have used to justify their claims on power.[89] The parallels with the three dimensions of classical counterinsurgency are apparent and, in the case of security and development, direct.   The correspondence between participation and the counterinsurgency dimension referred to variously as "politics," "administration," and "governance," is less clear.

What is the relationship between participation and good government?   How does each relate to political legitimacy?   If "governance" does not encompass participation, states usually conceive of this dimension of counterinsurgency as a matter of mobilization, i.e., inducing or compelling the population to act in accord with government designs.   "Participation" is not a role in determining how power is acquired and exercised, as in Riggs'

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[87] "Panel on Southern Provinces Proposes Elections," *Bangkok Post*, 13 July 1990; "Interior No. 1 Takes Charge; Cabinet Digs a Trap for Southern Bandits [มท.1 คุมเข้ม ครม.สัญจรขุดบ่อทุบโจรใต้]," *Krungthep turakit [กรุงเทพธุรกิจ]*, 28 March 2545 [2002].

[88] Chai-anan Samudavanija, "The Three-Dimensional State," *Rethinking Third World Politics*, ed. James Manor, (London; New York: Longman, 1991) 20.

[89] Duncan McCargo, "Security, Development and Political Participation in Thailand: Alternative Currencies of Legitimacy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24.1 (2002).

"constitutive system," but merely cooperation with the government. Although the 1980s saw three general elections, "electoral participation by the masses is ritualistic or mobilized participation rather than voluntary political action." [90] Tanet labeled Thailand's political system an "electocracy," in which participation begins and ends with voting for representatives.[91] Despite the waxing influence of extra-bureaucratic actors in the 1980s, political participation remained constrained by a "bureaucratic-parliamentary compromise." [92]

The concept of popular sovereignty is basic to the substitution of mobilization for participation in Thai-style democracy. The Democratic Soldiers advocated a democratic revolution, but they interpreted democracy as popular sovereignty. We have seen that Order 66/23 prescribed mobilization rather than direct political participation. Of course, the collective will is elusive and difficult to actualize and, for this reason, authoritarian governments often favor popular sovereignty as a basis for legitimacy.[93] The participatory dimension of Thai democracy remained shallow during the 1980s, but the political system was bolstered by energetic efforts at mass mobilization organized around the potent symbols of official Thai national identity–Nation, Buddhism, Monarchy.

It remains a matter of dispute whether or not this state-led mobilization would have been equal to the CPT challenge if the Sino-Vietnamese dispute and the Third Indochina War had not lead to a *de facto* alliance between Bangkok and Beijing and an end to Chinese support for the CPT.[94] In his study of the defeat of the CPT, Marks

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[90] Chai-anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy," *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, eds. Larry Jay Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990) 305.

[91] Tanet Charoenmuang, *Thailand: A Late Decentralizing Country* (Chiang Mai: Urban Development Institute Foundation, 2006) 20.

[92] John Girling, "Thailand in Gramscian Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 57.3 (1984): 402.

[93] Alagappa 38.

[94] General Saiyud stated that, "it would only be fair to say that events external to Thailand played a more significant role [in the defeat of the CPT]." (Saiyud 167.)

draws on Riggs to argue that the establishment of a constitutive system, with the support of reformist military officers, allowed counterinsurgency to succeed. The fledgling constitutive system amounted to, "a reorientation of concerns away from those of the bureaucracy to those of the people." [95] The political process in the 1980s generated sufficient legitimacy to allow the Thai state to prevail over a fractured Communist insurgency. Marks noted that, "counterinsurgency existed in a symbiotic relationship with its society"; if society had demanded changes in political practice, the strategy might well have failed.[96]

In 1959, Guy Pauker argued that the Thai army was the entity best suited to guide Thailand through the transition to modernity. Yet he wondered, "can the period of tutelage which seems necessary to create the social requisites of democracy be controlled by groups that would not perpetuate themselves for selfish advantages?" [97] In fact, the bureaucratic establishment resisted the development and institutionalization of political parties and an independent legislature. Only popular pressure for political change in the 1970s opened the door to more participatory politics. Reformist military officers like General Han sought to have the military and bureaucracy lead the democratization process. Instead, the bureaucratic establishment:

> … preferred bureaucratically guided liberalization expressed in terms of limited, controlled participation that emphasized consensus over competition, a minimally active legislature over an active and potent one, appointments over elections, and centralization over decentralization of power.[98]

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[95] Thomas Andrew Marks, "Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in Structural Perspective," Ph.D. Diss., University of Hawai'i, 1991: 395.

[96] Marks 402.

[97] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics* 11.3 (1959): 341.

[98] Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and Society in Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?" *Asian Survey* 33.9 (1993): 886.

Following victory over the CPT, Marks cautioned, some elements in the military continued to feel entitled to determine the course of national development:

> This creates an inherent contradiction within the constitutive system by creating pressures for a return to the mechanisms of the bureaucratic polity. The extent to which such sentiments can be controlled will decide the future of Thai democracy.[99]

This "contradiction" has not yet been resolved. Today, the basis for legitimacy in Thailand is disputed, in the southernmost provinces and beyond, with contention most pronounced on the issue of participation.

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[99] Marks, "Making Revolution" 408.

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