


by Beacon Consulting Limited

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
OVERVIEW


In March 2022, we monitored a marked increase in security incidents in North Central and North West Nigeria, with incidents in Niger and Kaduna State generating national and international attention. We also monitored a continuation of the Federal and State Governments' efforts to address the security challenges in the country using mainly security forces operations. We further monitored social upheaval associated with women groups, organised labour and students' union grievances with the government as well as significant disruption to petroleum product supply that has impacted operations. These are in addition to the inflation, supply chain disruption and hike in commodity prices triggered by the ongoing Russia - Ukraine war that has accentuated the structural deficiencies driving insecurity in Nigeria.




In March 2022, the government's efforts failed to prevent a month-to-month increase in security incidents and fatalities as well as kidnappings. Accordingly, in the third month of the year, we recorded 428 incidents that resulted in 702 abductions and 1497 fatalities. These affected 217 Local Government Areas in 35 states. A month-to-month analysis of the changes in the figures recorded in February 2022 and March 2022 shows a 40.1 % increase in kidnappings and a 68.8% increase in fatalities. A comparison of the incidents that occurred in March 2021 and March 2022, shows a 144% rise (175 – 428) in incidents, a 76.4 % increase in abductions (398 – 702), and a 143% increase in fatalities (887 – 1497).

A breakdown of these incidents shows 21% occurred in the North Central (548 fatalities) geopolitical region, 24% occurred in the North-West geopolitical region (482 fatalities), 19% in South West (72 fatalities), North East 16% (fatalities 313), South-South 12% (fatalities 44) and South East 08% (38 fatalities). A thematic analysis of the incidents shows 75% are raids (650 fatalities) by non-state actors and 12% ambush (108 fatalities) by these non-state actors.





The distribution of these incidents in the states shows North West and North Central Nigeria recorded the highest fatalities and abductions: Niger state 487 fatalities and 348 abductions, Kaduna state 226 fatalities and 348 abductions. An analysis of the above shows the continuation of the trend of several non-state actors successfully challenging the state's monopoly of the use of force.




2022 Quarter 1 Trend Analysis

Quarter 1 Fatalities

An analysis of the fatalities for the period January 01 - March 31, 2022, shows that we recorded a total of 3586 fatalities across the country. According to the geopolitical regions, a breakdown of these fatalities shows that the North West suffered the highest with 1373 deaths, followed by the North Central with 958 casualties, North East with 808 victims, South West with 183, South East with 174 and South-South 90.


The breakdown further shows that 38.3% of the Quarter 1 fatalities figures affected the North West region, 26.7% the North Central and 22.5% the North East. This puts the total percentage of fatalities in northern Nigeria at 87.5%.

In addition, an analysis of the states most affected by the fatalities in Quarter 1 shows the spread across 31 states and the FCT, with Niger state recording the highest fatalities at 795 deaths, followed by Borno 711, Kaduna 488, Zamfara 462, Katsina 235, Kebbi 161 and Anambra 88.



Quarter 1 Kidnapping

An analysis of the kidnappings for January 01 - March 31, 2022, shows that we recorded a total of 1808 abductions across the country. According to the geopolitical regions, a breakdown of these abductions shows that the North West suffered the highest with 1062 incidents, followed by the North Central with 464, North East 117 victims, South-South 72, South West 45 and South East 48. The breakdown further shows that 58.7% of the Quarter 1 abduction figures affected the North West region, 25.7% affected the North Central and 6.5% affected the North East. This puts the total percentage of kidnapping in northern Nigeria for January – March 2022 at 90.9%.



The major security trends observed in March 2022 are:

- Agitations within the police and a threat of strike action,
- Massive theft of crude and refined petroleum products affecting Nigeria's economy,
- The use of Improvised Explosive Devices as attack methods by non-state actors in Kaduna State,
- Social upheaval associated with a women's groups, national student union and organised labour, and petroleum product shortage cause movement disruption and obstruction to operations nationwide,
- The continuation of the activities of non-state actors and security forces operations across the country,
- Criminal activities in South-West Nigeria,
- There is a rise in violence associated with political events and politicians ahead of party primaries for the 2023 general elections and off-cycle elections in Ekiti and Osun State.

In March 2022, it emerged early in the month that some police operatives, mostly lower-ranked personnel, were mobilizing for a strike action to protest several grievances relating to their welfare, salary, and allowances. Although the strike action, which had been scheduled for March 26, 2022, did not take place, mainly due to proactive measures taken by the police management to assuage the aggrieved operatives as well as assurances of improved conditions of service, the development drew public attention to the deplorable state of welfare and operational circumstances of especially lower-ranked police personnel. Indications emerged that some police personnel who had allegedly taken part in mobilizing for the strike action were arrested and were facing disciplinary action. The incident, despite the effort of the police authorities to ward it off as rumours, was a manifestation of the challenges that continue to hamper effective policing in the country.

In the period being reviewed, we monitored the economic impact of disruptions affecting crude oil production and the distribution of refined petroleum products in Nigeria and the consequences of these on the oil-dependent economy. The most significant impact is Nigeria's inability to meet its OPEC quota of about 1.6 million barrels/day, with its current capacity hovering around 1.3 million barrels/day. This has denied Nigeria the opportunity to benefit from the current high international prices of oil.

Other consequences included the sustenance of the supply chain disruption of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) that followed the importation of sub-standard PMS and the suspension of the lifting of the product by the regulatory body, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the subsequent clean-up of the system. The resultant effect was shortages at the dispensing stations and in the supply chain of the PMS. The surrounding locations of the dispensing stations witnessed significant traffic congestion, where the funnelling effect impacted negatively on movement and increased the risk of exposure to petty and opportunistic crimes. Although Nigeria is a major producer of crude oil, the NNPC brings refined PMS into Nigeria using contractors or traders through its Direct Sale Direct Purchase (DSDP) scheme. Under the scheme, the oil company provides crude oil to its trading partners, who in turn supply the NNPC with refined products worth the volume of crude received. It is assessed as credible that Nigeria's crude oil production capacity and the refined oil (mostly imported) distribution will continue to suffer disruptions in the short term due to crude oil theft, especially in the Niger Delta region, and conflict and disruptions affecting refined oil production and global developments such as the Russia – Ukraine war that is limiting the government's ability to effectively implement the DSDP scheme.

Although the federal government continues to express concern at the huge theft of both the imported refined petroleum and the crude oil (some sources suggest as much as two-thirds of the country's production is stolen and a yet-to-be-determined quantity of the refined petroleum is siphoned, as well. In its latest audit report made public in July 2021, the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) indicated that in 2019, Nigeria lost 42.25 million barrels of crude oil to oil theft, valued at \$2.77 billion. An indication of the current size of the theft is the increased yearly budgetary provision for subsidy on PMS in 2022 to just above 4 trillion Naira – about 40% of the national budget). These thefts are ongoing in spite of security forces operations including the military operation Delta Safe. It is assessed as credible that these thefts will continue unless the government targets and disrupts the supply chain for the stolen refined products and crude oil.

We also monitored the trend of increasing criminality in parts of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. An analysis of these incidents indicates their prevalence in the outlying council areas of Abaji, Gwagwalada and Kuje mainly, where gunmen raid communities and abduct residents. In Abuja Municipal Council the predominant security challenge is mainly protest action targeting mainly government institutions and opportunistic and violent criminality. Over the monitored period, women groups, civil society activists and affirmative and gender parity protagonists converged and picketed the gate of the National Assembly to protest the refusal of the two chambers of the assembly. This caused movement disruption in the vicinity of the National Assembly.


Other incidents of significance include:

- At about 2300hrs on Saturday, March 05, 2022, in Abaji Abuja (FCT) Gunmen suspected to be bandits attacked a residence at Abattoir's new extension in Abaji, Abaji Area Council, Abuja. 3 people (husband, wife, and child) were abducted. The assailants later released the wife and child.
- On Wednesday, March 09, 2022, armed men killed a newspaper vendor while boarding a vehicle at Kabusa junction, Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), Abuja. The motive of the attackers remains unknown.
- At about 0200 hrs on March 12, 2022, armed criminals attacked the residence of a journalist in Lugbe, Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), Abuja. The journalist was injured, and valuables were stolen.
- On March 13, 2022 At least 4 gunmen suspected to be bandits assaulted and killed 1 person at his farm in Giri village, Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), Abuja. 5 others were injured and 4 people were arrested.
- On March 13, 2022, gunmen suspected to be armed criminals abducted a journalist in the Chika area, Lugbe, Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), Abuja.
- On March 22, 2022, in Kuje armed men suspected to be bandits abducted 3 people from the Godozhi community in Kuje Area Council, Abuja.
- On March 22, 2022 gunmen suspected to be bandits abducted 3 herders at Achido community in Abaji Area Council, Abuja.
- On March 23, 2022, gunmen suspected to be bandits abducted 10 people in the Chukuku community, Kuje Area Council, Abuja.
- On March 24, 2022, youths held a protest in the Chukuku community, Kuje Area Council, Abuja, over the abduction of 10 people by gunmen on March 23, 2022. The protesters burnt tyres, and barricaded the Kuje-Gwagwalada Road, resulting in traffic gridlock.
- On March 30, 2022, armed men attacked residences at the Pipeline Extension area in Kubwa, Bwari Area Council,
 Abuja. An unspecified number of local vigilantes were injured, and valuables were stolen from the residents.

SOUTH WEST


In the South West, in Lagos State, the Commissioner for Information and Strategy, Gbenga Omotoso, on March 10, 2022, announced his government's decision to suspend the activities of the National Union of Road Transport Workers Union (NURTW) and their activities in all the State's parks and garages. Omotoso added that the suspension of the activities of the union was necessitated to douse the unnecessary tension generated by the leadership tussle in the NURTW and protect the citizenry from the likely fallout of the situation. Following this suspension security agencies increased their presence and deployment at the parks and garages to prevent any breach of security by the factional union members. So far the development has not generated any security issues. It is however assessed as credible that this may change as political activities intensify and the politicians attempt to influence the outcome of the leadership succession in the union.


Additionally in the South West, the monitored period recorded the trend of increased criminal activities as well as a continuation of low-level political violence mainly associated with the preparation for governorship elections scheduled to take place in Ekiti State on June 18, 2022, and in Osun on July 16, 2022. It is assessed as credible that the prevalence of armed youths popularly called political thugs, who are engaged as non-state actors and the inability of the two major political parties in Ekiti and Osun State, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), to hold free and fair primary elections, has laid the foundation for a contentious governorship election and increased the potential for violence pre, during and post the election. The other issues monitored in the region are violent criminality including highway robbery along the Ibadan – Lagos and the Abeokuta – Lagos highways and the associated kidnap for ransom in these locations.




NORTH CENTRAL AND NORTH WEST

In the North Central and North West geopolitical regions, Kaduna state became the epicentre of the unfolding deterioration of security challenges in the two regions partly because of its proximity to the convergence of gunmen in ungoverned spaces in Niger state (North Central) and Katsina and Zamfara States (North West) and possibly due to political developments that are incentivizing the perpetrators. Over the monitored period, in Kaduna State, we recorded several attacks on critical infrastructure including the airport and the rail tracks. The most spectacular and attention-generating incident was a military precision attack by gunmen on the rail track linking Abuja to Kaduna state, which occurred at about 1945 hours, on March 28, 2022. The gunmen suspected to be bandits working with operatives of a terror group, the Jamat Ansar al Muslimeen fi Bilad al Sudan or Ansaru conducted a coordinated complex attack on the train at a point near the Rigassa train station, along the Abuja-Kaduna rail track, forcing the train heading to Kaduna from Abuja to stop. The attack included the deployment of an IED on the train tracks, gunshots, and abduction of yet to be specified number of persons. So far nine persons have been reported dead as a result of the attack, while an unspecified number of persons have been abducted.






Still in the North Central and North West, over the monitored period, we recorded a continuation of security forces operations against the activities of non-state actors including bandits with several arrested or killed, and others dislodged. However, these security forces operations failed to prevent the atrocities of the gunmen including the continuation of the use of Improvised Explosive Devices – IEDs as attack vectors, which were used to target mass event centres in parts of Kaduna State, including a one on March 26, 2022, which exploded in Kabala West area, Kaduna South LGA, Kaduna State. Police Anti-Bomb Squad was deployed to the location. An unspecified number of people were killed, and at least 3 people were injured.



We also continue to pick up reports of the Jamaat Ansar al Muslimeen fi Bilad al Sudan, or Ansaru's expansionist agenda in parts of North West and North Central Nigeria as it continues to seek spaces and partnerships with armed non-state actors operating in vast ungoverned parts of these regions. It is assessed as credible that the Ansaru group or its affiliates are involved in the bombing incidents.

Other trends that we monitored include incidents of attacks on commuters and rural communities, especially in the surrounding areas of Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State but also along several routes in Niger, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara states. Most of the incidents are attributable to itinerant gunmen who have been dislodged from their camps as a result of security forces operations.




We further monitored reports of non-state actors imposing levies and dues on communities in exchange for protection or access to farmlands or travel routes in several parts of the North West and North Central Nigeria including in Kaduna, Niger, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto States. It is assessed as credible that for the government efforts to contain and disrupt the activities of these non-state actors, the security forces must stop their versatility and ability to move in the affected locations as well as to find safe havens in the ungoverned spaces in addition to other measures listed at the end of this report.

In Bauchi, Taraba and Plateau States, in addition to a resumption of intercommunity conflicts and reprisal attacks between ethnic groups and banditry, we monitored the movement of marauding bandits across several communities. The most visible of these movements were in forested parts of Taraba and Bauchi States where they can access Garga forest, hence the potential for attacks in these vicinities.

NORTH EAST

In the North East, we monitored the response of terror groups in the Lake Chad Basin to the Islamic State's announcement of a new leader, on March 09, 2022. In a 12-minute-long audio recording that appeared on social media platforms affiliated with the group, it introduced its new Amir by the nom-de-guerre Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and claimed he has been leading the group since the death of his predecessor Shaikh Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi in February 2022. Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who according to the audio statement was selected for the role by his predecessor, becomes the third Amir to lead the terror group since it began calling itself Islamic State (IS). The group's first leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, killed himself during a U.S. raid, also in northwestern Syria, in 2019. The equally reclusive Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, also known by multiple other names including Hajji Abdallah and Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, was named as his replacement five days later. So far at least 6 different groups mainly in the vicinity of Lake Chad, the Sambisa forest, the Banki area, the Alagarno forest, and the Sahel region, pledged allegiance to the new IS leader. The disparate number of the groups is an indication of the new decentralized structure of the IS in the Lake Chad Basin. It is assessed as credible that the immediate period will likely see an intensification of attacks by the group to boost the profile and credentials of its new leader and groups that have pledged allegiance to him.

Still in the North East, we monitored a continuation of armed conflict between government security forces, led by Operation Hadin kai, and several non-state actors including the Islamist jihadist groups, the Jamatus Ahlis Sunna lil Dawatil wal Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), mostly affecting parts of northern Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It is assessed that the intensity of the armed conflict has reduced significantly indicating the improved tactics, techniques and procedures, especially in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as interservice and inter-agency coordination, collaboration and cooperation within the security forces. We monitored the shifting of the locations of security forces operations from ISWAP dominated environments in Alagamo forest to the Sambisa Forest and the vicinity of the Lake Chad Basin.



The major trends recorded in March 2022:

- Intense armed conflict in Abadam and Mallam Fatori, Borno State,
- A continuation of the Borno State Government peacebuilding efforts including the shutting down of IDP camps and opening of markets and travel routes,
- ISWAP's attacks on civilian targets include targeted abduction of humanitarian workers, resumption of illegal checkpoints along travel routes and the group's use of IEDs and suicide bombings as attack vectors, adoption of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes and ambush of military and civilian convoys,
- The increased interdiction attacks by the security forces with a noticeable improvement in the Nigeria Airforce support and response capabilities including a new military campaign in Southern Borno, leading to more effective repelling of JAS and ISWAP operatives' attacks and destruction of their platforms,
- Mass surrender of members of JAS and to a lesser extent that of ISWAP.

The monitored period recorded intense armed conflict between security forces and ISWAP operatives in Abadam LGA and Mallam Fatori, which appeared to be the latter's attempt to prevent government consolidation efforts in the location ahead of a planned relocation of IDPs and refugees. It is assessed that Mallam Fatori is a strategic location for ISWAP given its proximity to some of the group's main supply routes from the Republic of Niger and the corridors that connect north-central Borno with Lake Chad Basin. It is further assessed that the group will sustain its effort to prevent government consolidation efforts in the area during the rainy season when security forces' advancement and operations will be hampered.

We also recorded a continuation of the establishment of illegal checkpoints by suspected ISWAP operatives along major travel routes in Borno State, where they targeted commuters based on their faith or affiliation with the government or international organizations, as well as vehicles containing supplies belonging to either government or international organisations. The affected routes included Gubio-Damasak, Gajiram-Monguno and Dikwa-Ngala roads. A major trend in the monitored period was the IED incidents along the Maiduguri – Biu road, where we recorded 14 incidents and the recovery of three unexploded devices. We also monitored a gunmen (suspected to be ISWAP) ambush against a security forces convoy along the Bama-Pulka road.

In addition, we recorded clashes within ISWAP ranks and between ISWAP and JAS operatives. In addition, we continue to monitor a change in the conflict dynamics in southern Borno, where the military has intensified its campaign and ISWAP is dispersed and targeting communities. With these developments, we assess that ISWAP's strategic plan to establish a presence in former JAS territories and open up a supply channel through northern Adamawa state has been hampered in the short term.

The trend of the mass surrender of JAS and ISWAP operatives continued in the monitored period. Available information indicates that as of January 31, 2022, about 35,000 individuals, mostly JAS and ISWAP members and their families, surrendered themselves throughout the Lake Chad Basin and in Cameroon and the Niger Republic as well. The Borno State Government insists that the initiative was bolstered by a multi-stakeholder security town-hall meeting, held on August 29, 2021, which reviewed and adopted guidelines to approach the surrender of insurgents as a means of fostering peace in the state.


The effort by the Borno State government and its development partners ties into the ongoing effort by countries in the Lake Chad Basin to implement a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration of persons formerly associated with Boko Haram.

SOUTH EAST

In the South East, the major developments in the reporting period were the continued targeting of government buildings (particularly local government secretariats), traditional institutions, the deterioration of the political dispute and the security situation in Anambra and Imo state, a continuation of attacks on security forces formations and personnel, the reactions to the rescinding of a contentious sit at home order over the continued detention and the trial in custody in Abuja of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader, Nnamdi Kanu and the security forces action against the group and criminal elements in the region. A trend we are monitoring is the increasing use of improvised explosive devices in targeted attacks in the region. Some of the most impact incidents that we recorded in the region include:


- On March 01, 2022, in Onuimo, Imo State gunmen suspected to be members of the outlawed Indigenous People of Biafra or its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) set fire to the Okwelle Divisional Police Headquarters in Onuimo LGA, Imo State.
- On March 1 2022, in Njaba, Imo State gunmen suspected to be members of the outlawed Indigenous People of Biafra or its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) used Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to attack the Njaba Police station in Unuaka, Njaba LGA, Imo State. The attack resulted in a firefight with policemen before it was repelled. An unspecified number of assailants sustained gunshot wounds. A car and arms were recovered.
- On March 1, 2022, in Ohafia, Abia State unidentified armed men killed at least 4 people in Amangwu, Ohafia LGA,
 Abia State. Houses and shops were also set on fire.
- On March 01, 2022, a mob set fire to the house of a former federal lawmaker in Alayi, Bende LGA, Abia State.
- On March 03 and 04, 2022, Awka South, Anambra State residents of Umugama village in the Ukwulu community held a protest in Awka, Awka South LGA, Anambra State, against their traditional leader, whom they accused of land grabbing.
- On March 04, 2022, gunmen ambushed and injured a priest in Enugu town, Enugu North LGA, Enugu State. His car and telephones were stolen.
- On March 04, 2022, Owerri Municipal, Imo State, members of the Imo Youth Peace Movement held a protest in Owerri town, Owerri Municipal LGA, Imo State over heightened insecurity in the state. The protesters marched from the Control Post Roundabout through the Government House Roundabout down to Wetheral, Douglas Road, MCC Road, Bank Road, Okigwe Road, World bank Road, Orlu Road, and Teltlow Road.
- On March 04, 2022, in Nnewi South, Anambra State, South-East, gunmen attacked the Ebenator community in Nnewi South LGA, Anambra State. The assailants moved from house to house in search of guns owned by members of the Anambra Vigilante Group (AVG) residing in the community.
- March 05, 2022, in Idemili South, Anambra State, gunmen killed at least 3 people at a filling station in Nnokwa, Idemili South LGA, Anambra State.
- On March 08, 2022, in Owerri North, Imo State there was a violent clash between members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) and commercial drivers at Arugo park, along the Owerri-Onitsha Road, Owerri North LGA, Imo State. One person was killed.
- On March 11, 2022, Nnewi South Anambra State gunmen attacked Ndingbu and Utuh villages in Nnewi South LGA, Anambra State. 1 person was abducted, a vigilante office and vehicle were set on fire.

- On March 14, 2022, Aba North, Abia State, South-East there was an armed clash between Aro and Bobo armed gangs along the Agu Road by Onyemaechi street off Ohanku in Aba North LGA, Abia State. At least 2 people were killed.
- On March 15, 2022, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State gunmen suspected to be IPOB or ESN attacked the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) rehabilitation centre in Abakaliki LGA, Ebonyi State. Security forces personnel were deployed to the location and they succeeded in repelling the attack. 4 people including 1 security personnel, 1 patient, and 2 assailants were killed. An unspecified number of the assailants escaped with gunshot wounds.
- On March 15, 2022, Awka South, Anambra State Gang members attacked vigilantes at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Awka, Awka South LGA, Anambra State. An unspecified number of gang members were arrested.
- On March 16, 2022, Okigwe, Imo State Gunmen suspected to be IPOB or ESN ambushed patrol vehicles belonging
 to the Nigerian Correctional Service (NCS) at the Umulolo section of Okigwe town, Okigwe LGA, Imo State. The
 assailants set fire to the vehicle using an Improvised Explosives Device (IED). At least 2 NCS officers were killed,
 and an unspecified number of others were injured.
- On March 17, 2022, in Ikwo, Ebonyi State Gunmen killed 1 person in Ochanyim Amagu, Ikwo LGA, Ebonyi State.
- March 19, 2022, Nkwerre, Imo State Gunmen shot and killed 1 person at the Nweke Market Square in Nkwerre community, Nkwerre LGA, Imo State.
- March 19, 2022, Owerri West, Imo State Armed men with IEDs fired indiscriminately at the Umuguma Divisional Police Headquarters in Owerri West LGA, Imo State. 2 policemen were killed.
- On March 19, 2022, Oru East, Imo State Armed men with IEDs fired indiscriminately at the residence of the President-General of Ohanaeze Ndigbo Worldwide in Awo- Omamma, Oru East LGA, Imo State. The assailants set the house on fire.
- March 19, 2022, Nwangele, Imo State Armed men mounted on motorcycles attacked members of the Abba Vigilance Group and Abba Security Network in Nwangele LGA, Imo State. Their patrol vehicle was set on fire.
- March 20, 2022, Oru East, Imo State Gunmen with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) fired indiscriminately at the Omuma Police Station in Oru East LGA, Imo State. The attack resulted in a firefight with policemen before it was repelled. At least 4 assailants were killed, and 5 undetonated IEDs were recovered.
- On March 22, 2022, in Onicha, Ebonyi State Armed men attacked a residence in Isu Okoma of Onicha LGA, Ebonyi State. The assailants killed a young lady after she was abducted and raped.
- On March 23, 2022, Ezza North, Ebonyi State Gunmen shot and killed the Commander of Ebubeagu Security Outfit in Umuezeoka community, Ezza North LGA, Ebonyi State.
- March 27, 2022, Anaocha, Anambra State Gunmen shot and killed 1 person in Aguluzigbo, Anaocha LGA, Anambra state.
- On March 28, 2022, Enugu North, Enugu State IPOB members enforcing the sit-at-home exercise fired indiscriminately in Aria New Market along the Iva Valley Road, Enugu North LGA, Enugu State. At least 1 person was killed, and an unspecified number of people were injured.
- March 31, 2022, Nnewi South, Anambra State Gunmen attacked the Nnewi South LGA Secretariat in the Ukpor community, Anambra State. 1 security quard was killed, and the building was set on fire.
- March 31, 2022, Izzi, Ebonyi State Gunmen killed an operative of the Ebube Agu security outfit at his residence in Nduogbuovu, Izzi LGA, Ebonyi State. The assailants also stole his motorcycle.



SOUTH-SOUTH

In the South-South, the monitored period recorded an intensification of criminal activities and clashes between armed groups and security forces in Rivers and Bayelsa state and an increase the inter-community tensions and a growing political rift in Edo State as well as socio-political developments in Delta state that could trigger violence. The trend of gunmen targeting commuters along travel routes and individuals that are either politically exposed or affluent has been sustained.



Communities responded to the elevated security challenges by evolving self-help initiatives including attempts to institutionalize self-help and protection measures or protests, where they block major travel routes in a bid to call attention to the deteriorating security situation. All these are leading to a further collapse of social order and the yawning distrust between government and citizens.

Beacon Consulting has assessed as credible that for the government efforts to decrease the ability of non-state actors to challenge the supremacy of the use of force by the state to be sustainable, the Federal and State Governments need to enhance collaboration for enhanced administration of criminal justice and the restoration of social order by addressing the root causes of these challenges including socio-economic grievances, unemployment and the effects of climate change as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Other measures include the need for the Federal and State Governments to collaborate in dominating the forested and other ungoverned spaces, which the bandits use as safe havens and to keep their victims.



Our outlook for the coming weeks is based on trends derived from the incident analysis in March 2022

- The dislodgement of gunmen from bases and camps due to the ongoing interdiction operations by the security forces in North East, North Central, and North-West Nigeria will lead to further unwarranted one-off attacks against defenceless communities in these and neighbouring regions,
- Political violence localised to political events and gatherings will continue as preparations continue for off-cycle elections and the political party events including party primaries for the 2023 general elections,
- Criminal activities including kidnap for ransom, violent and petty crimes as well as home invasions are likely to
 continue in the short and medium terms due to the deteriorating economic circumstances of the country and rising
 inflation. This is likely to be accentuated by the effect of the Russia Ukraine war on commodities and the supply
 chain disruption it engendered,
- A continuation of non-state actors' activities challenging the supremacy of the state's monopoly of force and sustenance of their attacks on communities including kidnap for ransom and raids. In turn, this will push communities to evolve self-help initiatives, including protests, where they block access routes and arm themselves.
- The deteriorating security situation will continue to fuel political rancour and the exchange between the ruling party and its members and between it and opposition parties,
- Social upheaval especially protests by civil society organisations and political groups hiding behind civil activists will intensify as a major driver of security challenges as the effect of the economic hardship forces government at the Federal and State levels to take measures to manage these impacts,
- In the North East, the non-state actors waging a terror war and the ongoing military operation Hadin Kai will continue the armed conflict. The restructuring and consolidation of ISWAP and its reduced membership will translate into bolder attacks and a review of their attack methods and techniques. This will mean a continuation of armed attacks and counter attacks as well as illegal checkpoints mounted along major travel routes particularly in Borno state and in the border towns of Yobe and Adamawa states,
- The trend shows increasing criminal activities, especially in South-West Nigeria; it is evolving and requires robust community-based prevention and law enforcement measures.

ADVISORY

Resilience and Risk Management Solutions

The threat factors and the evolving trends in Beacon Intel's monthly report represent different levels of risks to individuals and corporate organisations as determined by their vulnerabilities – a function of their profiles, exposure and mitigation measures.

Individuals and corporate organisations must understand these threats and the inherent risks; a necessary prerequisite for adopting the appropriate risk treatment. As security threats are transient, the approach should be dynamic and forward-looking. An intelligence-based security management system is a functional means for individuals and corporate organisations to enhance their resilience and reduce their risks to as low as practically possible.



BEACON CONSULTING

We are a Nigerian-owned security consulting company based in Abuja, Nigeria, operating throughout Africa. Beacon Consulting was incorporated in 2013 and has been providing bespoke security advisory services, risk management, and resilience solutions to a range of clients.

All the information presented in the report was sourced from open sources and subsequently verified using a mix of industry-standard methods.

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